8.81 The ALRC has been directed to consider legislation that imposes limitations or barriers that could discourage older people from working. This consideration requires identifying disincentives to participation and incentives to leave the workforce.
8.82 Access to superannuation may amount to an incentive to leave the workforce. However it is also an earned benefit and a statutory right. Delaying access to superannuation may delay retirement and compel workforce participation. This outcome would conflict with the framing principles for this Inquiry, particularly independence and self-agency.
8.83 Accordingly, the ALRC has not recommended changes to access rules. If such recommendations were to be made, then they should be made after a review considering all aspects of the superannuation system, including equity, adequacy and sustainability, and not only its impact on workforce participation.
8.84 However, because the relationship between access to superannuation and older people’s workforce participation is of significant public interest, this section reviews the issue and reports on the submissions received on this topic.
8.85 The Transition to Retirement (TTR) rules were designed to encourage continued workforce participation among mature age workers. There is no evidence that they are meeting this goal, and some evidence that they might be a disincentive to participation. The ALRC recommends that the TTR rules be further reviewed to determine what changes are required to ensure that the rules encourage workforce participation.
When can members access superannuation?
8.86 Members of superannuation funds can withdraw their money as follows:
8.87 At age 65. There are no restrictions on the way people 65 years and over may access their superannuation benefits.
8.88 At preservation age if retired. The preservation age ranges from 55 to 60 years, depending on year of birth:
(a) for a person born before 1 July 1960—55 years; or
(b) for a person born during the year 1 July 1960 to 30 June 1961—56 years; or
(c) for a person born during the year 1 July 1961 to 30 June 1962—57 years; or
(d) for a person born during the year 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963—58 years; or
(e) for a person born during the year 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1964—59 years; or
(f) for a person born after 30 June 1964—60 years.
8.89 In other words, the preservation age will increase from 55 to 60 years between the years 2015 and 2025.
8.90 A person who has reached preservation age (but is less than 60 years old) is considered retired if an employment arrangement has come to an end and the superannuation fund is satisfied that the person does not intend to become employed again. If the person is aged 60 years or over, the person is considered retired if an employment arrangement has come to an end after the person turned 60 years.
8.91 There are no restrictions on the way members of, or over, the preservation age can access their superannuation when they retire.
8.92 Under the Transition to Retirement rules. These rules enable members who are of, or over, preservation age to access their superannuation before they retire. Members may only take superannuation benefits as a non-commutable income stream (that is, an income stream that cannot be converted into a lump sum). No more than 10% of the account balance may be paid each year. Members can continue working in any capacity while receiving superannuation benefits under the TTR rules, as no work test applies.
8.93 Early access. Early release of benefits is possible but the grounds are limited. They include severe financial hardship and certain compassionate grounds.
8.94 There are two further age settings relevant to superannuation: the tax-free access age at 60 years, and the Age Pension age. In 2013, the Age Pension age is 65 years. From 2017 to 2023, the Age Pension age will incrementally increase to 67 years.
How do superannuation access ages affect workforce participation?
8.95 There are many determinants of continued participation in the paid workforce among older workers: health and disability, educational attainment, a spouse’s retirement, caring responsibilities, employer attitudes, and financial resources (including superannuation and Age Pension eligibility). Access to training and skills development, and opportunities for flexible work also affect the decision to work or retire.
8.96 Access to superannuation is clearly a highly relevant factor. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) reported that, among retired men and women whose last job was fewer than 20 years ago,
the most commonly reported main reason for ceasing their last job was ‘reached retirement age/eligible for superannuation/pension’ (44% of men and 27% of women). These people had one of the highest average retirement ages of 62.0 years (62.8 years for men and 60.8 years for women).
8.97 Superannuation, an annuity or allocated pension was the main source of income at retirement for 27% of men and 13% of women. For the 44% of women whose partner’s income was their main source of funds at retirement, their partner’s access to superannuation might be a relevant factor in their retirement decision.
8.98 There are substantial numbers of people whose retirement decision is affected by having reached the access age for superannuation, and those numbers will rise as the superannuation system matures. Changes to the access age for superannuation can be expected to affect the workforce participation rates for these people.
8.99 However, many people retire due to sickness, injury or disability (26% of men and 21% of women), because of unemployment (10% of men and 9% of women), or to care for children or an ill, disabled or elderly person (11% of women and 3% of men). These people are, on average, younger than those who retire because they have ‘reached retirement age or are eligible for superannuation or a pension’. For these people, a change to the access age is less likely to affect workforce participation, but it may affect their financial circumstances. Some of these people rely on superannuation funds to replace or supplement income support payments until reaching Age Pension age.
8.100 The gap between the superannuation preservation age and Age Pension age is of concern both in terms of workforce participation and the sustainability of the superannuation system. The Grattan Institute said that
many workers retire before reaching the pension age and start using their superannuation. … The ability to use superannuation like this weakens the incentive to continue to work until the pension age.
8.101 In other words, access to superannuation funds creates an incentive to withdraw from work and rely on superannuation funds until Age Pension age. Drs Diana Warren and Umut Oguzoglu measured this incentive, finding that
for men aged between 60 and 64 years, there are significant financial incentives to retire from the labour force and once the age pension eligibility age has been reached, the incentive to retire is much stronger. For women, the financial incentives before the age pension eligibility age are not significant, but there appears to be a weak incentive to retire once the age pension eligibility age has been reached.
8.102 In 2004, the Australian Government made changes to superannuation arrangements that were intended to reduce incentives to retire. Taxes on lump sum withdrawals, and on earnings on superannuation accounts in pension phase were abolished, and income from superannuation was disregarded in assessing income tax. It was thought that these arrangements would encourage people over 60 years to remain in the workforce. This did not prove to be the case. While there is an upward trend for mature age participation in the workforce, the trend was not affected by the 2004 changes.
Calls for increased access ages
8.103 The Tax Review recommended that the preservation age be increased to 67 years, to align with the increased Age Pension age. This recommendation was framed as a response to a changing environment for the retirement income system, including:
Dramatic long term changes in Australia’s demographic structure, with an increasing proportion of aged people and a declining proportion of working-age people;
Increasing life expectancies, leading to a longer average period in retirement and particularly strong growth in the number of people in the oldest age groups;
Advances in health technology that are improving the quality of life for many people with previously debilitating ailments.
8.104 The changes were said to create problems for the sustainability of the retirement income system. In particular, future taxpayers will have to pay much higher taxes to pay for the health care and pensions of older people who will make up a higher proportion of the population.
8.105 There are also concerns about the adequacy of retirement incomes. Superannuation was intended to improve retirement incomes, but longer periods in retirement mean that people may not be able to accumulate sufficient savings to make a real difference to their retirement incomes. Submissions from the superannuation industry were particularly concerned about the adequacy of superannuation in light of increased longevity.
8.106 The approaching seven year gap between the preservation age of 60 years (from 2025) and the Age Pension age of 67 years (from 2023) may contribute to problems of sustainability and adequacy. Early retirement funded by superannuation savings both increases the length of retirement and reduces retirement savings, resulting in increased dependence on the Age Pension. The Tax Review noted that responding to increasing longevity by increasing the preservation age would ‘enhance the acceptability, adequacy and sustainability of the retirement income system’. It anticipated that increasing the preservation age would reduce total pension costs and reduce tax for workers.
8.107 A related concern arising from the changing demographics of the Australian population is that Australia will have a labour supply problem, leading to reduced economic growth. The Intergenerational Report (2010) suggests that average annual growth in real GDP will slow from 3.3% to 2.7% in 40 years, and says the ageing of the population is ‘the major factor driving the slowing in economic growth’. The report calls for improved labour force participation and, in particular, the removal of barriers to participation for mature aged people who want to work. However, the report stops short of calling for the removal of incentives to retire, such as access to superannuation at 60 years.
8.108 Increasing the preservation age may assist individuals by encouraging workforce attachment, increasing their superannuation savings and reducing the likelihood of exhausting these savings. It is easier for mature age people to continue working rather than to withdraw from the workforce and later seek to re-enter when their retirement savings are diminished. In particular, people without financial literacy may retire at 60 believing their superannuation is sufficient to fund their retirement until reaching Age Pension age. If they are incorrect and their funds are exhausted before they reach 67, they face having to try to re-enter the workforce after a long absence. This is more difficult for older workers, who tend to have a longer duration of unemployment than younger workers. The Grattan Institute found that:
Aligning incentives for older people to stay in work seems to be more important than helping them find it. Measures to encourage people to work for longer in life are likely to have the greatest impact on older age workforce participation.
8.109 Stakeholders said that an increase in the preservation age is consistent with increases in life expectancy, particularly healthy life expectancy. One stakeholder noted that it is a legitimate response to another contemporary reality, the replacement of labour intensive work with less demanding white collar work.
Objections to an increased preservation age
8.110 Access to superannuation funds has a significant impact on retirement decisions in Australia. However, financial resources are not the only determinant in the retirement decision. ABS data indicates that many people retire for health reasons, because of unemployment, or because of caring responsibilities. Stakeholders emphasised that many people do not choose when to retire, and were particularly concerned about workers in labour intensive industries who are physically unable to work until aged 67 years. Stakeholders reported significant discrimination against older workers, and there is evidence suggesting that, while unlawful, this form of discrimination may be widespread. Unemployed mature age people spend longer looking for work than do younger people. For these workers, an increased preservation age might increase the time they have to rely on the Disability Support Pension or unemployment benefits.
8.111 While there is a shift away from labour intensive work, this work remains an important and continuing component of the modern workforce. A number of submissions said that it is unreasonable and unfair to expect people who have spent their entire adult lives doing hard physical work to continue to do so until aged 67 years.
8.112 An increased preservation age would also have a disproportionate impact on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who have a life expectancy approximately 10 years less than other Australians.
8.113 These submissions highlight the difficulty of setting a preservation age that applies to all workers, and does not take individual differences into account. While most people over 60 years are in good health and do not do hard physical labour, the preservation age should be fair for all workers. One way to achieve this goal might be to expand the early access provisions, which currently allow early access because of ‘severe financial hardship or on compassionate grounds’. The regulations limit the grounds for release to specified situations including a need to pay for medical treatment, palliative care, funeral or burial or to avoid foreclosure of a mortgage or the forced sale of a home. AIST suggested that another approach would be to vary the preservation age according to ‘a person’s gender, occupation or other factors that may impact on a person’s ability to participate in the workforce’.
8.114 A number of stakeholders reiterated the importance of choice for older people. This concern is consistent with the framing principles for the Inquiry. These principles include independence and self-agency, both of which encompass the principle of choice. The ACTU stated that it
rejects the notion that existing age settings encourage workers in meaningful paid employment to retire before they are ready to, and increasing such age settings would only serve to unfairly limit their choices, restrict individual agency, and would provide no incentive or assistance for workers who wish to remain in employment to do so.
8.115 While some stakeholders rejected the proposal regarding raising access ages outright, others indicated that the preservation age should not be raised ‘at this time’. For example, both National Seniors Australia and COTA Australia (representing older Australians) suggested that the preservation age should not be increased until there are changes in employer attitudes to older workers so that people can reasonably expect to be employed until the age of 67 years. Other stakeholders said that the preservation age should not be raised without further review, consultation or research. Among these stakeholders, there seems to be a recognition that, in the long term, the preservation age will require adjustment. The adjustment may need to be accompanied by some flexibility for workers who have worked in labour intensive industries, who have health problems, disability, or caring responsibilities. Future reconsideration of the preservation age should also include reconsideration of the early access provisions.
The tax-free access age
8.116 This section considers whether to raise the age at which a person of preservation age may access superannuation (above a set cap) without paying tax. The ALRC concludes that this change should not be recommended—because there is little evidence that it would increase workforce participation.
8.117 The taxation arrangements for superannuation benefits are complex and are not fully described here. For the purposes of this Inquiry, it is sufficient to note that, in most cases, people aged 60 years and over are not required to pay tax when they receive superannuation benefits.
8.118 People who have reached preservation age, but who are under 60 years old, can generally withdraw funds up to a ‘low rate cap’ amount tax-free. The low rate cap is a lifetime limit. In 2012–2013 it is $175,000. Amounts above the low rate cap are taxed up to 15% (plus Medicare levy).
8.119 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC asked whether, as an alternative to raising the preservation age, the tax-free access age should be raised from 60 years to:
62 years—to maintain the current five-year gap with the Age Pension age when the latter increases from 65 to 67 years;
65 years—to align with the unrestricted superannuation access age; or
67 years—to align with the Age Pension age.
8.120 Raising the tax-free access age may be a softer approach than raising the preservation age. It would allow mature age people to access superannuation benefits at age 60 (rather than, for example, 62 or 67 years) if they choose to do so. In other words, it uses the ‘carrot’ of tax incentives rather than the ‘stick’ of raising the age at which a person can access their retirement savings. Professor John Freebairn and Dr Diana Warren, in their examination of ways to increase mature age participation, said that aligning the tax-free access age with the Age Pension age is a ‘logical policy option’. This approach may be more consistent with this Inquiry’s framing principles of independence and self-agency. Some stakeholders agreed that raising the tax-free age might amount to an incentive to continue working.
8.121 However, the evidence that increasing the tax-free access age will result in increased workforce participation by older workers is not strong. Until 2007, lump sum superannuation withdrawals up to $129,000 were tax-free. In 2007, tax-free access was extended to all withdrawals made by people aged over 60 years. This was intended to be an incentive to continue working until at least that age.
8.122 In a 2008 survey of 2,501 Australian workers aged 40–59, around half of the respondents indicated that the change was likely to influence them to stay in the workforce up to, or past, the age of 60. However, a 2010 report from the Melbourne Institute assessed the 2007 changes and found that they did not have a statistically significant impact on mature age workforce participation. In particular, men aged 55–59, who would be expected to be affected by the changed arrangements, did not increase their participation. Modelling commissioned by Mercer Asia Pacific also showed that the reforms had a ‘marginal’ impact on workforce participation by people over 55. It has been suggested that a likely reason for the lack of impact is that the removal of the tax on amounts over $129,000 only affected a small number of high income workers.
8.123 The tax-free amount for members accessing superannuation before the age of 60 years is now $175,000. Increasing the tax-free age would still allow people to access up to $175,000 tax-free at preservation age. This amount is much higher than the median superannuation balance for people aged 55–59 in 2009–10 ($35,932). While balances will certainly grow as the system matures, it will take some time before the tax-free age can be expected to be a workforce participation incentive for a large portion of the population.
8.124 Further, as noted earlier, many people are not able to take advantage of financial incentives to stay in the workforce. Many leave the workforce involuntarily due to disability, unemployment or caring responsibilities. For these people, loss of tax-free status until reaching 62, 65 or 67 years could mean a lower standard of living in retirement and heavier reliance on the Age Pension or other income support payments.
8.125 Several stakeholders opposed raising the tax-free age on the basis that it would not remove barriers to work, but would limit choice and restrict the independence of older people.
8.126 There was little support among stakeholders for raising the tax-free age but not the preservation age. Those supporting an increased tax-free age thought that both the tax-free age and the preservation age should increase. It was suggested that this would both reduce complexity and maintain the present five-year gap between the tax-free age and the Age Pension age.
8.127 Some stakeholders also indicated that the tax-free status of superannuation is unaffordable and should be reconsidered.
8.128 Finally, stakeholders suggested that the question of the appropriate age for tax-free access should be considered as part of an inquiry that can consider all aspects of the superannuation system and conduct broad public consultation.
8.129 The ALRC concludes that the evidence that raising the tax-free age (rather than the preservation age) would encourage workforce participation among mature age workers is not strong, and therefore no recommendation to raise this age has been made.
Transition to Retirement (TTR) rules
8.130 The TTR rules allow workers to access their superannuation when they have reached preservation age but not retired. The TTR rules were introduced to encourage continued workforce participation, but do not appear to have done so. The ALRC recommends that the Australian Government initiate a review of the rules to determine what changes are required to ensure that they encourage workplace participation.
8.131 Prior to the introduction of the TTR rules in 2005, workers under 65 years of age generally had to retire before accessing any superannuation benefits. In 2004, the Australian Government noted that this may have led to ‘people deciding to retire prematurely just so they can access their superannuation’. The objective of the TTR rules is to ‘encourage people to retain a connection with the workforce for a longer period’ by providing flexibility in the superannuation access rules.
8.132 The Australian Government also noted that the pre-2005 laws did not ‘adequately cater for more flexible workplace arrangements where people may choose to reduce their work hours as they get older’. The TTR rules were intended to facilitate continued employment by enabling people over preservation age to reduce work hours and supplement their income with a superannuation income stream.
8.133 The TTR rules can also be used to allow workers 55 years and over to increase their contributions to superannuation and reduce their tax. This is an accepted use of the rules—for example, it is described on the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s Moneysmart website as a way to boost superannuation.
8.134 The TTR income stream enables workers over preservation age to:
salary sacrifice more of their remuneration package into superannuation, with the TTR pension income replacing the salary income they would have received if they did not salary sacrifice. Here, the person’s current lifestyle and cashflow can remain the same and, in effect, the super pension withdrawals can fund superannuation contributions.
8.135 This use of the TTR rules is limited by the caps on superannuation (although it can sometimes be tax effective to fund non-concessional contributions in this way). This approach to TTR is not available to all workers, as some employers do not offer salary sacrifice arrangements.
8.136 The above strategy can be used by people who do not intend to retire, but wish to benefit from the concessional tax treatment applied to superannuation. The benefits vary according to a person’s taxable income and the balance in the fund. In 2012–2013, they were said to be between $2,473 and $8,154 per year.
Do TTR rules encourage workforce participation?
8.137 A 2008 survey of 2,501 Australian workers aged 40–59 asked respondents about their awareness of the TTR rules and how they might use them. Only half of the respondents were aware of the TTR rules, and only 29% of respondents aged 50–54 thought they would use them. Of those who were aware of the TTR rules, two thirds said they were likely or very likely to use the rules to reduce their workforce participation (by working fewer hours and still retiring at the same age).
8.138 In a 2010 report commissioned by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, the Melbourne Institute analysed the effect of the TTR reforms. The Melbourne Institute concluded that the TTR rules had ‘no significant effect’ on the workforce participation of mature age men and women. Professor Paul Gerrans suggested that the TTR rules are now primarily a tax planning mechanism rather than a workforce participation incentive.
8.139 The ALRC has not found any evidence that the TTR rules are encouraging workforce participation. The determinants of retirement, reviewed above, include financial resources, health and disability, the availability of work and caring responsibilities. The availability of tax concessional retirement savings arrangements does not appear to be a significant incentive or disincentive.
8.140 On the other hand, the superannuation industry and others contend that the TTR rules create workforce participation incentives. The Financial Services Council suggested that the Melbourne Institute study may not have found a workplace participation effect because the 2001–2008 period examined was also a time of mining, asset price and share market booms in Australia that may have encouraged earlier retirement.
8.141 Some stakeholders supported the TTR rules on the basis that they encourage retirement savings. The original policy intention of the rules was to encourage workforce participation and to cater for more flexible workplace arrangements—not to encourage retirement savings. It is not clear that their continued existence could be supported on the retirement savings ground alone. The targeting of the incentives to middle and upper income earners aged 55–65 could be difficult to justify on equity grounds. Access to TTR arrangements for the purpose of increasing retirement savings is also limited because some employees do not have access to salary sacrifice arrangements; and many are unaware of the existence of the rules. Setting up a TTR arrangement can be complex and it is usually necessary to speak to a financial adviser before doing so. This creates a barrier to access for those who do not normally use an adviser to manage their finances.
8.142 The TTR rules do not represent a limitation or barrier to mature age workforce participation. However the ALRC is concerned that they may not meet their policy objective of encouraging continued mature age participation in the workforce. In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed that the rules should be reviewed to determine what changes, if any, are required to ensure that the rules meet their policy objective. Many stakeholders addressing this issue supported such an inquiry. No further evidence has come to light indicating that TTR rules are encouraging mature age participation in the workforce. Accordingly, the ALRC recommends that an inquiry be held into the TTR rules to consider whether they should be altered to ensure that the rules meet their policy objective.
Recommendation 8–3 The ‘Transition to Retirement’ rules were introduced into the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) to encourage continued mature age workforce participation. The Australian Government should review these rules to determine what changes, if any, are required to ensure they meet their policy objective. The review should consider matters including:
(a) the use of the rules in practice;
(b) whether there is sufficient access to the scheme;
(c) the relationship to the concessional superannuation contributions cap; and
(d) comparable international schemes.
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Grey Areas—Age Barriers to Work in Commonwealth Laws, Discussion Paper 78 (2012), 1.12.
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 1 item 106.
 Ibid reg 6.01.
 Ibid reg 6.01(7).
 Ibid sch 1 item 101.
 Ibid regs 1.05(11A)(a); 1.06 (9A)(a); 6.01; sch 1 item 110.
 Ibid reg 6.01. This reflects the underlying policy that the rules are ‘not intended to provide people with a vehicle to dissipate their superannuation savings excessively before retirement’: Explanatory Statement, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Amendment Regulations (No 2) 2005 (Cth).
 ATO, Transition to Retirement—Information for Superannuation Professionals (2006).
Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) s 79B; Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 6.01, 6.19A.
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) s 23(5A), (5D).
 J Borland, Transitions to Retirement: A Review, Melbourne Institute Working Paper 03 (2005), Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, the University of Melbourne, 19–26.
 C Phillipson and A Smith, Extending Working Life: A review of the research literature, Research Report No 299 (2005), Department for Work and Pensions, 44–50.
 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Retirement and Retirement Intentions, Australia, July 2010 to June 2011, Cat No 6238.0 (2011), 5.
 Ibid, Table 7.
 Ibid, 6.
 Ibid, 5.
 Ibid, Table 5.
 Ibid, 5. There is no compulsory retirement age in Australia, but ‘reached retirement age/eligible for superannuation/pension’ is a reason for retirement in the ABS survey. Certain occupational groups, such as judges and military personnel, have compulsory retirement provisions: see Chapter 4.
 Women in Super, Submission 64.
 J Daley, Game-changers: Economic Reform Priorities for Australia: Grattan Institute Report No 2012–5 (2012), 54.
 J Freebairn and D Warren, ‘Retirement Incomes and Employment Decisions of the Mature Aged’ (2010) 43(3) Australian Economic Review 312.
 D Warren and U Oguzoglu, ‘Retirement in Australia: a Closer Look at the Financial Incentives’ (2010) 43(4) Australian Economic Review 357. This article models the effect of changes to the pension age but not changes to superannuation access ages.
 B Headey, ‘Economics of Population Ageing: Australia May Not Have a Labour Supply Problem, but Recent Superannuation Reforms Have Not Helped’ in T Griffin and F Beddie (ed) Older Workers: Research Readings (2011).
 The Treasury, Australia’s Future Tax System: The Retirement Income System—Report on Strategic Issues (2009), 17.
 Ibid, 15.
 Ibid, 15. This analysis has been disputed by Hanegbi who suggests that the increased costs of an ageing population will be dwarfed by the increase in GDP per capita, so that the tax burden on future tax payers will be insignificant: R Hanegbi, ‘Australia’s Superannuation System: A Critical Analysis’ (2010) 25 Australian Tax Forum 303, 310.
 The Treasury, Australia’s Future Tax System: The Retirement Income System—Report on Strategic Issues (2009), 15.
 Financial Services Council, Submission 89; Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Submission 77; Suncorp Group, Submission 66.
 The Treasury, Australia’s Future Tax System: The Retirement Income System—Report on Strategic Issues (2009), 37.
 Ibid, 35.
 Ibid, 37.
 The Treasury, Intergenerational Report 2010—Australia to 2050: Future Challenges (2010), ix. Not all commentators agree that Australia’s changing demographics create concerns about economic growth. Heady notes that participation rates for both men and women aged 55–64 have been steadily increasing since the mid-1980s, driven by improvements in health and education, changed attitudes to women’s participation and more white collar jobs. He argues that these trends are likely to continue and the participation rate of 55–64 year olds ‘will easily surpass the 67% level mentioned as desirable by Treasury’: B Headey, ‘Economics of Population Ageing: Australia May Not Have a Labour Supply Problem, but Recent Superannuation Reforms Have Not Helped’ in T Griffin and F Beddie (ed) Older Workers: Research Readings (2011), 70.
 The Treasury, Intergenerational Report 2010—Australia to 2050: Future Challenges (2010).
 J Piggott, Correspondence, 13 August 2012.
 In May 2012, the average duration of unemployment for people aged 45 and over was 62 weeks, compared to 34 weeks for those aged 25–44 years: DEEWR, FaHCSIA, DHS, DIISRTE, Submission to the Senate Inquiry on the Adequacy of the Allowance Payment System for Job Seekers and Others (2012), 47.
 J Daley, Game-changers: Economic Reform Priorities for Australia: Grattan Institute Report No 2012–5 (2012), 52.
 Australian Industry Group, Submission 37.
 Suncorp Group, Submission 66. See further Chapter 2.
 Financial Services Council, Submission 89. See also P McDonald, ‘Employment at Older Ages in Australia: Determinants and Trends’ in T Griffin and F Beddie (eds), Older Workers: Research Readings (2011) 25, 39.
 Government of South Australia, Submission 95; DOME Association, Submission 62.
 Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Submission 77; Women in Super, Submission 64; Cbus, Submission 41; but see Financial Services Council, Submission 89: ‘labour intensive sections of the workforce make up a declining portion of the total workforce, and should not be afforded a disproportionate level of emphasis’.
 Law Council of Australia, Submission 96; National Seniors Australia, Submission 92; COTA, Submission 51; Olderworkers, Submission 22.
 See Chapter 3.
 Law Council of Australia, Submission 96; ACTU, Submission 88; Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Submission 77; Women in Super, Submission 64; Cbus, Submission 41.
 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Experimental Life Tables for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians, Australia, 2005–2007, Cat No 3302.0.55.003 (2009).
Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) s 79B.
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 6.19A.
 Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Submission 77.
 Law Council of Australia, Submission 96; Government of South Australia, Submission 95; ACTU, Submission 88; Suncorp Group, Submission 66.
 ACTU, Submission 88.
 Ibid; DOME Association, Submission 62; Cbus, Submission 41.
 National Seniors Australia, Submission 92; COTA, Submission 51; Olderworkers, Submission 22.
 National Seniors Australia, Submission 92; COTA, Submission 51.
 Australian Industry Group, Submission 97; Law Council of Australia, Submission 96; Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Submission 77; Women in Super, Submission 64.
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301–10.
 Ibid s 301–20.
 Ibid s 307–345; ATO, ‘Low Rate Cap on Super Lump Sum Benefits’ <www.ato.gov.au> at 21 March 2013.
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 301–20.
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Grey Areas—Age Barriers to Work in Commonwealth Laws, Discussion Paper 78 (2012), Question 8–3.
 This terminology is used in R Chomik and J Piggott, Mature-Age Labour Force Participation: Trends, Barriers, Incentives, and Future Potential (2012), Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research Briefing Paper 2012/01, 11.
 J Freebairn and D Warren, ‘Retirement Incomes and Employment Decisions of the Mature Aged’ (2010) 43(3) Australian Economic Review 312, 318.
 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Submission 85; Suncorp Group, Submission 66; Women in Super, Submission 64.
 A Borowski, ‘Back at the Crossroads: The Slippery Fish of Australian Retirement Income Policy’ (2008) 43 Australian Journal of Social Issues 311, 327.
 P Costello (Treasurer), ‘A Plan to Simplify and Streamline Superannuation’ (Press Release, 9 May 2006).
 M Walter, N Jackson, and B Felmingham, ‘Keeping Australia’s Older Workers in the Labour Force: A Policy Perspective’ (2008) 43 Australian Journal of Social Issues 291, 301.
 B Headey, J Freebairn and D Warren, Dynamics of Mature Age Workforce Participation: Policy Effects and Continuing Trends, Final Report (2010), Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, 131.
 Ibid, 74.
 P Promnitz, ‘Better Super: 12 Months On’ <www.ceoforum.com.au> at 21 March 2013.
 J Freebairn, Some Policy Issues in Providing Retirement Incomes (2007), Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series, Working Paper No 6/07, 18.
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 307–345; ATO, ‘Low Rate Cap on Super Lump Sum Benefits’ <www.ato.gov.au> at 21 March 2013.
 R Clare, Developments in the Level and Distribution of Retirement Savings, Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia Research Paper (2011), Table 2. The median balance is quite low because many people (32% of males and 39% of females) have no superannuation: ibid, 9.
 National Seniors Australia, Submission 92.
 Government of South Australia, Submission 95; National Seniors Australia, Submission 92; ACTU, Submission 88.
 Financial Services Council, Submission 89; Brotherhood of St Laurence, Submission 86; Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Submission 85; Suncorp Group, Submission 66. The Law Council of Australia submitted that the tax-free age and the preservation age should be the same: Law Council of Australia, Submission 96.
 National Welfare Rights Network (NWRN), Submission 99; Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Submission 77.
 The Treasury, A More Flexible and Adaptable Retirement Income System (2004), 10.
 The Treasury, Transition to Retirement Consultation Paper (2004), 4.
 The Treasury, A More Flexible and Adaptable Retirement Income System (2004), 10.
 ASIC, ‘Transition to Retirement’, 29 June 2012 <www.moneysmart.gov.au> at 21 March 2013.
 D Shirlow, ‘Bringing the Use of TTR Pensions Closer to Home’ (2011) (4) CCH Australian Superannuation News.
 SMSF Academy Managing Director Aaron Dunn cited in J Frost, ‘Breach cap and you’ll wear it’, The Australian, 14 July 2012.
 M Walter, N Jackson, and B Felmingham, ‘Keeping Australia’s Older Workers in the Labour Force: A Policy Perspective’ (2008) 43 Australian Journal of Social Issues 291, 299.
 Ibid, 300.
 B Headey, J Freebairn and D Warren, Dynamics of Mature Age Workforce Participation: Policy Effects and Continuing Trends, Final Report (2010), Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, 83–85.
 P Gerrans, Submission 74.
 Financial Services Council, Submission 89; Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Submission 77; Suncorp Group, Submission 66; Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Submission 44.
 Financial Services Council, Submission 89.
 Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Submission 47.
 A Borowski, ‘Back at the Crossroads: The Slippery Fish of Australian Retirement Income Policy’ (2008) 43 Australian Journal of Social Issues 311, 324–326.
 Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Submission 47.
 DOME Association, Submission 62; Law Council of Australia, Submission 46; National Seniors Australia, Submission 27. See also M Walter, N Jackson, and B Felmingham, ‘Keeping Australia’s Older Workers in the Labour Force: A Policy Perspective’ (2008) 43 Australian Journal of Social Issues 291.
 ASIC, ‘Transition to Retirement’, 29 June 2012 <www.moneysmart.gov.au> at 21 March 2013.
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Grey Areas—Age Barriers to Work in Commonwealth Laws, Discussion Paper 78 (2012), Proposal 8–7.
 National Welfare Rights Network (NWRN), Submission 99; Australian Industry Group, Submission 97; Law Council of Australia, Submission 96; Government of South Australia, Submission 95; National Seniors Australia, Submission 92; ACTU, Submission 88; Brotherhood of St Laurence, Submission 86; Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Submission 85; P Gerrans, Submission 74; DOME Association, Submission 62. AIST ‘would not object’ (Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Submission 77) and the FSC opposed the proposed review as ‘neither appropriate or necessary’ (Financial Services Council, Submission 89).