2.8 Beginning with a series of cases in 1992, the High Court has recognised that freedom of political communication is implied in the Australian Constitution. This freedom ‘enables the people to exercise a free and informed choice as electors’.
2.9 The Constitution does not protect a personal right, but rather, the freedom acts as a restraint on the exercise of legislative power by the Commonwealth.
The freedom is to be understood as addressed to legislative power, not rights, and as effecting a restriction on that power. Thus the question is not whether a person is limited in the way that he or she can express himself or herself, although identiﬁcation of that limiting effect may be necessary to an understanding of the operation of a statutory provision upon the freedom more generally. The central question is: how does the impugned law affect the freedom?
2.10 However, the freedom is not absolute. For one thing, it only protects some types of speech—political communication. ‘It is limited to what is necessary for the effective operation of that system of representative and responsible government provided for by the Constitution.’
2.11 In Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997), the High Court formulated a two-step test to determine whether a law burdens the implied freedom. As modified in Coleman v Power , the test involves asking two questions:
1. Does the law, in its terms, operation or effect, effectively burden freedom of communication about government or political matters?
2. If the law effectively burdens that freedom, is the law nevertheless reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government, and the procedure prescribed by s 128 of the Constitution for submitting a proposed amendment of the Constitution to the informed decision of the people?
2.12 The Australian Constitution has not been found to protect free speech more broadly.
Principle of legality
2.13 The principle of legality provides some protection to freedom of speech. When interpreting a statute, courts will presume that Parliament did not intend to interfere with freedom of speech, unless this intention was made unambiguously clear.
2.14 For example, in Attorney-General (South Australia) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013), French CJ said:
The common law freedom of expression does not impose a constraint upon the legislative powers of the Commonwealth or the States or Territories. However, through the principle of legality, and criteria of reasonable proportionality, applied to purposive powers, the freedom can inform the construction and characterisation, for constitutional purposes, of Commonwealth statutes. It can also inform the construction of statutes generally and the construction of delegated legislation made in the purported exercise of statutory powers. As a consequence of its effect upon statutory construction, it may affect the scope of discretionary powers which involve the imposition of restrictions upon freedom of speech and expression.
2.15 International instruments provide for freedom of expression including the right to ‘seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers’. The UN’s Human Rights Committee provides a detailed list of forms of communication that should be free from interference:
Political discourse, commentary on one’s own and on public affairs, canvassing, discussion of human rights, journalism, cultural and artistic expression, teaching and religious discourse.
2.16 International instruments cannot be used to ‘override clear and valid provisions of Australian national law’. However, where a statute is ambiguous, courts will generally favour a construction that accords with Australia’s international obligations.
Bills of rights
2.17 In other countries, bills of rights or human rights statutes provide some protection to certain rights and freedoms. Bills of rights and human rights statutes protect free speech in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. For example, the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) gives effect to the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, art 10 of which provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2.18 Although the right may be stronger for being incorporated into statute law, the particular freedom may not necessarily be different from the freedom recognised at common law: several members of the House of Lords expressed the opinion ‘that in the field of freedom of speech there was in principle no difference between English law on the subject and article 10 of the Convention.’
2.19 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides significant protection to free speech. In New York Times v Sullivan, Brennan J spoke of a ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials’.
2.20 Free speech is also is provided for in the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities and the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).
Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1.
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 570.
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; Nationwide News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Wotton v Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1; Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506.
Unions NSW v State of New South Wales (2013) 88 ALJR 227  (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). Also, the High Court said in Lange: ‘Sections 1, 7, 8, 13, 24, 25, 28 and 30 of the Constitution give effect to the purpose of self-government by providing for the fundamental features of representative government’: Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557 (the Court). Sections 7 and 24 do not ‘confer personal rights on individuals. Rather they preclude the curtailment of the protected freedom by the exercise of legislative or executive power’: Ibid 560 (the Court).
However, French CJ has said that the ‘class of communication protected by the implied freedom in practical terms is wide’: Attorney-General for South Australia v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1, 43  (French CJ).
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 561.
Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1.
Attorney-General for South Australia v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1, 43–44  (French CJ).
The principle of statutory interpretation now known as the ‘principle of legality’ is discussed more generally in Ch 1.
Attorney-General (South Australia) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1, 30–33 –; Evans v State of New South Wales  FCAFC 130 (15 July 2008) ; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex Parte Simms  2 AC 115 130.
Attorney-General (South Australia) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1, 32  (French CJ). See also, Monis v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92, 331.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 19(2). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights also enshrines freedom of speech in its preamble: Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.
United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 34 (2011) on Article 19 of the ICCPR on Freedoms of Opinion and Expression (CCPR/C/GC/34) .
Minister for Immigration v B (2004) 219 CLR 365, 425  (Kirby J).
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 287 (Mason CJ and Deane J). The relevance of international law is discussed more generally in Ch 1.
United States Constitution amend I.
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42, s 12 and sch 1 pt I, art 10(1).
Canada Act 1982 c 11, Sch B Pt 1 (’Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’) s 2(b).
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 14.
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42, sch 1 pt I, art 10(1).
Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (Spycatcher)  1988 UKHL 6 283–284 (Lord Goff). This was approved in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd  AC 534 550–551 (Lord Keith); R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex Parte Simms  2 AC 115.
New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964) 270 (Brennan J, giving the opinion of the Court).
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) s 15; Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 16.