18.2 This chapter discusses the source and rationale of this common law principle; how the principle is protected from statutory encroachment; and when laws that limit judicial review may be justified. The ALRC calls for submissions on two questions.
Question 18–1 What general principles or criteria should be applied to help determine whether a law that restricts access to judicial review is justified?
Question 18–2 Which Commonwealth laws unjustifiably restrict access to judicial review, and why are these laws unjustified?
18.3 In Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982), Brennan J said:
Judicial review is neither more nor less than the enforcement of the rule of law over executive action; it is the means by which executive action is prevented from exceeding the powers and functions assigned to the executive by law and the interests of the individual are protected accordingly.
18.4 Access to the courts for the purpose of judicial review is an important common law right. In his Introduction to Australian Public Law, David Clark gives a brief history of judicial review of administrative action:
Judicial review in the administrative law sense originated in the 17th century when various prerogative writs, so called because they issued in the name of the Crown, began to be issued against administrative bodies. These writs, such as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus originated in the 13th century, but were originally confined to review of the decisions of inferior courts. … By the late 17th century the writs began to be used against administrative agencies such as the Commissioners of Sewers, and the Commissioners for Bridges and Highways. With the dramatic expansion of State functions in the 19th century and the emergence of innumerable statutory bodies, committees, commissions, and other administrative agencies, the way was open for the expansion of judicial review in this sense.
The power to judicially review what were once called inferior jurisdictions (lower courts and administrative agencies) arrived in Australia with the opening of the first Supreme Courts in Van Diemen’s Land and New South Wales in 1824 … The power to review by certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was, in origin, a common law power and was, therefore, a power of jurisdiction created by the courts through their judicial decisions.
18.5 However, as noted further below, statutes sometimes provide that certain administrative or judicial decisions may not be reviewed by courts. A privative clause—also known as an ouster clause—is a statutory provision that attempts to restrict access to the courts for judicial review of administrative decisions. They are ‘essentially a legislative attempt to limit or exclude judicial intervention in a certain field’.
18.6 Other means are also sometimes used to limit judicial review, such as placing time limits on when proceedings can be initiated.
‘The position and constitution of the judicature could not be considered accidental to the institution of federalism: for upon the judicature rested the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance and enforcement of the boundaries within which government power might be exercised and upon that the whole system was constructed’: R v Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 276 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ).
‘The reservation to this Court by the Constitution of the jurisdiction in all matters in which the named constitutional writs or an injunction are sought against an officer of the Commonwealth is a means of assuring to all people affected that officers of the Commonwealth obey the law and neither exceed nor neglect any jurisdiction which the law confers on them’: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513–514  (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
The Terms of Reference refer to laws that ‘restrict access to the courts’. The ALRC understands this to refer to the common law power of judicial review, rather than to the broader but related subject of access to justice.
Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, 70 (Brennan J).
David Clark, Introduction to Australian Public Law (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2013) 247.
Simon Young, Privative Clauses: Politics, Legality and the Constitutional Dimension, in Matthew Groves, Modern Administrative Law in Australia: Concepts and Context (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 277.