2.54 Laws that interfere with traditional rights and freedoms are sometimes considered necessary for many reasons—such as public order, national security, public health and safety. The mere fact of interference will rarely be sufficient ground for criticism.
2.55 Important rights often clash with each other, so that some must necessarily give way, at least partly, to others. Freedom of movement, for example, does not give a person unlimited access to another person’s private property, and convicted murderers must generally lose their liberty, in part to protect the lives and liberties of others. Individual rights and freedoms will also sometimes clash with a broader public interest—such as public health or safety, or national security.
2.56 Accordingly, it is widely recognised that there are reasonable limits even to fundamental rights. Only a handful of rights—such as the right not be tortured—are considered to be absolute. Limits on traditional rights are also recognised by the common law. In fact, some laws that limit traditional rights may be as traditional as the rights themselves. However, such laws are generally regarded as part of the scope of common law rights, rather than as limits or encroachments on those rights.
2.57 Bills of rights in other jurisdictions and international human rights covenants and related guidelines also feature limitations provisions. For example, limits on rights in the ICCPR are recognised in the text of the ICCPR and are elaborated upon in the ‘Siracusa Principles’. 
2.58 Nevertheless, much of the value of calling something a right will be lost if the right is too easily qualified or diluted. Many common law rights were developed carefully over long periods of time and have been applied in many cases. In many jurisdictions, these rights are considered so fundamentally important that they have constitutional status. There seems little doubt, therefore, that the common law rights in the Terms of Reference should be treated with considerable respect in law making and should not lightly be encroached upon. Where a law does encroach on a traditional right, the encroachment should be justified.
2.59 ‘Human rights enjoy a prima facie, presumptive inviolability, and will often “trump” other public goods,’ Louis Henkin wrote in The Age of Rights:
Government may not do some things, and must do others, even though the authorities are persuaded that it is in the society’s interest (and perhaps even in the individual’s own interest) to do otherwise; individual human rights cannot be sacrificed even for the good of the greater number, even for the general good of all. But if human rights do not bow lightly to public concerns, they may be sacrificed if countervailing societal interests are important enough, in particular circumstances, for limited times and purposes, to the extent strictly necessary.
2.60 The ALRC has been asked to consider whether limits on traditional rights and freedoms are ‘appropriately justified’. This question might be considered on two broad levels. The first involves testing the law according to a particular measure or standard—such as proportionality. Laws that pass this standard might be said to have been substantively justified. This is the most commonly used meaning of the word justified, in this context, and it is the main focus of this Inquiry.
2.61 The second level concerns the processes that lead to the making of the law—the procedural justification. It is not suggested, however, that procedural justification implies substantive justification. Both of these types of justification are discussed below.
2.62 A common way of determining whether a law that limits rights is justified is by asking whether the law is proportionate. This concept is commonly used by courts to test the validity of laws that limit rights protected by constitutions and statutory bills of rights. However, proportionality tests can also be a valuable tool for law makers and others to test the justification of laws that limit other important—even if not strictly constitutional—rights and principles.
2.63 In short, a structured proportionality analysis involves considering whether a given law that limits important rights has a legitimate objective andis suitable and necessary to meet that objective, and whether—on balance—the public interest pursued by the law outweighs the harm done to the individual right.
2.64 A 2014 book on the jurisprudence of proportionality includes this ‘serviceable—but by no means canonical’ formulation of the test:
1. Does the legislation (or other government action) establishing the right’s limitation pursue a legitimate objective of sufficient importance to warrant limiting a right?
2. Are the means in service of the objective rationally connected (suitable) to the objective?
3. Are the means in service of the objective necessary, that is, minimally impairing of the limited right, taking into account alternative means of achieving the same objective?
4. Do the beneficial effects of the limitation on the right outweigh the deleterious effects of the limitation; in short, is there a fair balance between the public interest and the private right?
2.65 Proportionality has been called the ‘most important doctrinal tool in constitutional rights law around the world for decades’ and ‘the orienting idea in contemporary human rights law and scholarship’.
Proportionality has been received into the constitutional doctrine of courts in continental Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Israel, and South Africa, as well as the jurisprudence of treaty-based legal systems such as the European Court of Human Rights, giving rise to claims of a global model, a received approach, or simply the best-practice standard of rights adjudication. Even in the United States, which is widely understood to have formally rejected proportionality, some argue that the various levels of scrutiny adopted by the US Supreme Court are analogous to the standard questions posed by proportionality.
2.66 Proportionality may now also be said to have been received to some extent into the constitutional doctrine of courts in Australia. For example, in McCloy v New South Wales, the High Court applied a structured proportionality test to determine whether a law infringed the constitutional right to political communication. More commonly the courts have considered this question in terms of whether the law is ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end’, which reflects a form of proportionality analysis.
2.67 The Court in McCloy explained how proportionality has been used in various contexts in Australian law:
The term ‘proportionality’ in Australian law describes a class of criteria which have been developed by this Court over many years to determine whether legislative or administrative acts are within the constitutional or legislative grant of power under which they purport to be done. Some such criteria have been applied to purposive powers; to constitutional legislative powers authorising the making of laws to serve a specified purpose; to incidental powers, which must serve the purposes of the substantive powers to which they are incidental; and to powers exercised for a purpose authorised by the Constitution or a statute, which may limit or restrict the enjoyment of a constitutional guarantee, immunity or freedom, including the implied freedom of political communication. Analogous criteria have been developed in other jurisdictions, particularly in Europe, and are referred to in these reasons as a source of analytical tools which, according to the nature of the case, may be applied in the Australian context.
2.68 Proportionality is used by Australian parliamentary committees to scrutinise Bills. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, for example, applies a proportionality test. The Committee’s Guide to Human Rights states:
A key aspect of whether a limitation on a right can be justified is whether the limitation is proportionate to the objective being sought. Even if the objective is of sufficient importance and the measures in question are rationally connected to the objective, the limitation may still not be justified because of the severity of its impact on individuals or groups.
2.69 In a public sector guidance sheet about permissible limits on rights, the Attorney-General’s Department includes a list of ‘useful questions to ask when assessing whether a measure limiting a right is reasonable, necessary and proportionate’:
Will the limitation in fact lead to a reduction of that problem? Does a less restrictive alternative exist, and has it been tried? Is it a blanket limitation or is there sufficient flexibility to treat different cases differently? Has sufficient regard been paid to the rights and interests of those affected? Do safeguards exist against error or abuse? Does the limitation destroy the very essence of the right in issue?
2.70 A classic discussion of the principle of proportionality may be found in the 1986 Canadian Supreme Court case of R v Oakes. This case concerned a drug control statute that placed a legal burden of proof on the defendant, and so undermined the person’s right, under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter guarantees the rights and freedoms in the Charter ‘subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’.
2.71 Dickson CJ said that to establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, two central criteria must be satisfied. The first concerned the importance of the objective of the law:
First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to serve, must be ‘of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom’. The standard must be high in order to ensure that objectives which are trivial or discordant with the principles integral to a free and democratic society do not gain s 1 protection. It is necessary, at a minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be characterized as sufficiently important.
2.72 Secondly, the means chosen for the law must be ‘reasonable and demonstrably justified’, which involves ‘a form of proportionality test’ with three components:
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair ‘as little as possible’ the right or freedom in question. Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of ‘sufficient importance’.
2.73 In each case, Dickson CJ said, courts will be ‘required to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups’. There are variations, but the language in Oakes is reflected in most proportionality tests.
2.74 Proportionality—‘a single flexible standard’—has been contrasted with the law of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which ‘uses a multitude of less flexible, but more precise, rules designed to respond to particular kinds of cases’.
2.75 In Roach v Electoral Commissioner, Gleeson CJ expressed reservations about an ‘uncritical translation’ of proportionality into Australia from jurisdictions with human rights instruments and wider powers of judicial review. In Momcilovic, Heydon J suggested that the proportionality test in the Victorian Charter created ‘difficult tasks’ that should be for legislatures, not judges. Professor John Finnis has said that all the proportionality criteria ‘involve matters of fact (including counter-factuals) and evaluative opinion in which legal learning is of little assistance and forensically ascertainable evidence is unavailable’:
[T]here is little or nothing judicial—nothing law applying—about assessments of proportionality in relation to rights such as those in the [European Convention on Human Rights], when these assessments are made by courts coming fresh to them in the context of general legislative or legislatively approved arrangements for social life.
2.76 However, some of these concerns may not arise when the proportionality analysis is being applied by law makers, parliamentary committees and others to test the merits of laws, rather than by courts.
2.77 Other criticisms of proportionality apply more broadly. Some have suggested that proportionality tests give insufficient weight to rights, or call for the comparison of incommensurable values. Others have said it ‘suggests a far more rigorous algorithm of criteria than is in fact or law available’. Proportionality has even been called an ‘assault on human rights’. To balance rights may be to ‘miss the distinctive moral status that a rights claim presupposes and affirms’. Far from rights being ‘trumps’, a balancing approach might suggest that everything is ‘up for grabs’.
2.78 Nevertheless, in submissions to this Inquiry, a number of stakeholders said that proportionality was the appropriate concept to apply. For example, the Law Council of Australia submitted that the proportionality test in R v Oakes ‘has been applied in Australian domestic law and can produce logical and predictable outcomes when applied to legislation’:
‘Proportionality’ is … a fluid test which requires those analysing and applying law and policy to have regard to the surrounding circumstances, including recent developments in the law, current political and policy challenges and contemporary public interest considerations.
2.79 In its submission to this Inquiry, the Human Rights Law Centre stated that
the test for determining whether a restriction is appropriate should be one of proportionality as used in international and comparative human rights jurisprudence and under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) … A proportionality test is appropriate as it preserves rights, provides a framework for balancing competing rights and enables other important public concerns, such as national security and public order, to be duly taken into account. 
2.80 The Public Interest Advocacy Centre endorsed the use of the principle and suggested that it could be ‘more deeply embedded’ in Australian law.
2.81 In this Inquiry, the ALRC does not consider the question of whether testing the proportionality of laws that limit rights is better carried out by the judiciary or the legislature. Nor is it necessary, in this Inquiry, to find a perfect method—if such a method exists—for testing the justification of laws that limit rights. Whether a particular law that limits a right is justified will of course sometimes be a question about which reasonable people acting in good faith disagree. A rigid insistence on a prescribed proportionality framework may also discourage more thorough and wide ranging analysis.
2.82 While the ALRC does not propose that one particular method must always be used to test the justification for laws that limit traditional rights and freedoms, proportionality tests offer a valuable way of structuring the critical analysis. They call for a considerable degree of rigour, and are clearly more thorough than mere unsupported statements that a law is justified because it is in the public interest. Proportionality is also used widely in many other countries and jurisdictions. When considering similar laws in Australia, law makers will naturally find these other analyses instructive. Importantly, the use of proportionality tests suggests that important rights and freedoms should only be interfered with reluctantly—when truly necessary.
2.83 A law that limits important rights may be said to be justified in another more limited sense, namely, that it was made following open and robust scrutiny. A law that limits a right might therefore be said to be justified procedurally, if the law was made after a procedure that thoroughly tested whether the limit was substantively justified. A fundamental procedural justification for laws might be, for example, that they are made by a democratically elected parliament in a country with a free press. Another important process is scrutiny by parliamentary committees.
2.84 Rigorous processes for scrutinising laws for compatibility with traditional rights may be more important in jurisdictions without a constitutional bill of rights. So called ‘political rights review’ or ‘legislative rights review’, Professor Janet Hiebert has written,
entails new responsibilities and new incentives for public and political officials to assess proposed legislation in terms of its compatibility with protected rights. This innovation results in multiple sites for non-judicial rights review (government, the public service, and parliament), which distinguish this model from the American-inspired approach that relies almost exclusively on judicial review for judgments about rights.
2.85 In Chapter 3, the ALRC discusses some procedural protections of traditional rights in more detail, with a particular focus on scrutiny by parliamentary committees. In Australia, proposed laws are checked for compatibility with traditional rights at a number of stages in the law making process. For example, when developing policy, government departments are encouraged to think about the effect a proposed law will have on rights. Bills and disallowable legislative instruments presented to Parliament must have a ‘statement of compatibility’ that assesses the legislation’s compatibility with the rights and freedoms in seven international human rights instruments—which include most of the traditional rights and freedoms in the ALRC’s Terms of Reference. The Attorney-General’s Department plays an important role in providing advice about human rights law and often helps agencies prepare statements of compatibility.
2.86 There are multiple parliamentary committees that review legislation, and three committees have a particular role in considering whether proposed laws are compatible with basic rights: the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances, and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights.
2.87 The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor reviews Australia’s counter-terrorism and national security laws and considers whether such laws are proportionate, necessary and contain safeguards to protect individual rights. Law reform bodies such as the ALRC also routinely consider rights and freedoms in their work. Under the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth), the ALRC has a duty to ensure that the laws, proposals and recommendations it reviews, considers or makes:
(a) do not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties or make the rights and liberties of citizens unduly dependent on administrative, rather than judicial, decisions; and
(b) are, as far as practicable, consistent with Australia’s international obligations that are relevant to the matter.
2.88 Because of the close relationship between many traditional common law rights and human rights protected by international covenants and instruments, an important role is also played by the Australian Human Rights Commission. The Commission, established in 1986, and its predecessor, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, established in 1981, have as their purpose, working
for the progressive implementation of designated international conventions and declarations through representations to the Federal Parliament and the executive, through other public awareness activities, and where appropriate through intervention in judicial proceedings.
2.89 No less importantly, laws are often scrutinised by the public and in the press.
2.90 Clearly, there are already many processes for testing the compatibility of proposed laws with important rights and freedoms. Some are relatively new, such as the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, established in 2011. Some are much older, like the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances, established in 1932. In Chapter 3, the ALRC considers whether some of these existing procedures might be improved. For example, the ALRC considers whether the justifications given to parliamentary committees and in compatibility statements are generally adequate, or could be made more thorough and the reasoning more explicit.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) arts 6, 7, 8 (paras 1 and 2) 11, 15, 16 and 18: art 4.2. See, eg, Williams and Hume, above n 5, [5.3]. See also Attorney-General’s Department, Absolute Rights <http://www.ag.gov.au>.
United Nations Economic and Social Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (28 September 1984). These principles were formulated at a conference sponsored by non-governmental organisations in Siracusa, Italy, in 1984. The object of the conference was to achieve a consistent interpretation and application of the limitation and restriction clauses of the ICCPR.
Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia University Press, 1990) 4.
See Terms of Reference.
Former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, Aharon Barak, said proportionality can be defined as ‘the set of rules determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for a limitation on a constitutionally protected right by a law to be constitutionally protected’: Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 3.
In other words, proportionally tests need not only be used by courts, and need not only be used to test limits on constitutional rights.
G Huscroft, B Miller and G Webber (eds), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2014). Cf Aharon Barak: ‘According to the four sub-components of proportionality, a limitation of a constitutional right will be constitutionally permissible if (i) it is designated for a proper purpose; (ii) the measures undertaken to effectuate such a limitation are rationally connected to the fulfilment of that purpose; (iii) the measures undertaken are necessary in that there are no alternative measures that may similarly achieve that same purpose with a lesser degree of limitation; and finally (iv) there needs to be a proper relation (“proportionality stricto sensu” or “balancing”) between the importance of achieving the proper purpose and the special importance of preventing the limitation on the constitutional right’: Barak, above n 94, 3.
Kai Moller, ‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 709, 709.
Huscroft, Miller and Webber, above n 96, 1.
Ibid. The Siracusa Principles, noted above, includes a proportionality test: United Nations Economic and Social Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (28 September 1984) , .
McCloy v New South Wales  HCA 34 (7 October 2015).
‘What upon close scrutiny is disproportionate or arbitrary may not answer to the description reasonably appropriate and adapted for an end consistent or compatible with observance of the relevant constitutional restraint upon legislative power’: Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162,  (Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ). The question of whether a law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to advance a legitimate object ‘involves what is referred to in these reasons as “proportionality testing” to determine whether the restriction which the provision imposes on the freedom is justified’: McCloy v New South Wales  HCA 34 (7 October 2015)  (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). See also Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication’ (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 668, 677.
McCloy v New South Wales  HCA 34 (7 October 2015)  (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Parliament of Australia, Guide to Human Rights (2014) 8.
Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Permissible Limitations, available at <www.ag.gov.au>.
R v Oakes  1 SCR 103 –.
The Victorian Charter similarly provides: ‘A human right may be subject under law only to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and taking into account all relevant factors including—(a) the nature of the right; and (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; and (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; and (d) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) any less restrictive means reasonably available to achieve the purpose that the limitation seeks to achieve’: Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 7(2). See also, Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 28; New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 5.
R v Oakes  1 SCR 103 –.
Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure Revisited’ 28(3) UNSWLJ 842, 844. ‘The choice between the competing merits of these approaches depends on rather large questions of fact and value. Rules will appeal to those who value certainty in the application of judicial rules and who believe that rules created by one court are capable of constraining later and lower courts. Flexible standards will appeal to those who value flexibility and to those who are, in any event, sceptical about the capacity of legal doctrine to effectively constrain judges’: Ibid.
Human rights instruments ‘create a relationship between legislative and judicial power significantly different from that reflected in the Australian Constitution’: Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162,  (Gleeson CJ).
‘It will lead to debates in which many different positions could be taken up. They may be debates on points about which reasonable minds may differ. They may be debates in which very unreasonable minds may agree. They are debates that call for resolution by legislative decision’: Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1,  (Heydon J). Heydon J said that s 7(2) ‘creates a kind of “proportionality” regime without comprehensible criteria’: Ibid .
John Finnis, ‘Judicial Power: Past, Present and Future’ (Speech, Gray’s Inn Hall, London, 20 October 2015) 21.
The role of parliamentary committees is discussed below and in Ch 3.
For criticisms of proportionality reasoning, see, eg, Francisco J Urbina, ‘Is It Really That Easy: A Critique of Proportionality and “Balancing as Reasoning”’ (2014) 27 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 167; Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 468; Gregoire CN Webber, ‘Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship’ (2010) 23 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 179. In defence, see, eg, Moller, above n 97; Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
John Finnis, ‘Judicial Power: Past, Present and Future’ (Speech, Gray’s Inn Hall, London, 20 October 2015) 20.
Tsakyrakis, above n 115.
This is Ronald Dworkin’s well-known metaphor: Ronald Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps’ in Jeremy Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (Oxford University Press, 1984).
Tsakyrakis, above n 115, 489. ‘With the balancing approach, we no longer ask what is right or wrong in a human rights case but, instead, try to investigate whether something is appropriate, adequate, intensive, or far-reaching’: Ibid 487.
National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 143; Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 141; Law Council of Australia, Submission 140; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 133; ANU Migration Law Program, Submission 107; Law Council of Australia, Submission 75; Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 39. See also Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies, Submission 58. Although in most submissions, the justification for laws limiting rights was not discussed at this more general level.
Law Council of Australia, Submission 75.
Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 39.
It also suggested how might this be done: Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 133.
Hiebert, above n 14, 9. See also Janet L Hiebert and James B Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 4.
Valuable resources about human rights may be found on the Attorney-General’s Department website: <www.ag.gov.au>. See also, Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers (2011); Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Tool for Assessing Human Rights Compatibility’ <www.ag.gov.au>. In addition to these guides, agencies are encouraged to consult early and often with relevant areas of the Attorney-General’s Department where rights encroachment issues arise. See, eg, Drafting Direction No 3.5—Offences, Penalties, Self-Incrimination, Secrecy Provisions and Enforcement Powers 2013 , .
Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth) s 24(1).
Shearer, above n 65, 55.