11.1 The privilege against self-incrimination allows a person to refuse to answer any question, or produce any document or thing, if doing so would tend to expose the person to conviction for a crime.
11.2 A statutory form of the privilege is available in the Uniform Evidence Acts. The statutory protection is only available to resist disclosure of information in a court proceeding. The common law privilege is available to persons subject to questioning in both judicial and other proceedings.
11.3 A number of rationales have been said to underpin the privilege. In recent judgments, it has been said to be necessary to preserve the proper balance between the powers of the state and the rights and interests of citizens, to preserve the presumption of innocence and to ensure that the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. At other times, the courts have described the privilege as a human right, necessary to protect the privacy, freedom and dignity of the individual.
11.4 The privilege places barriers in the way of investigations and prosecutions, particularly where information is peculiarly within the knowledge of certain persons who cannot be expected to share that information voluntarily. Parliament has, at times, considered that the public interest in the full investigation of matters of public concern outweighs the public interest in the maintenance of the privilege. Many Commonwealth statutes give government agencies—including the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)—the power to compel a person to answer questions, and provide that the privilege against self-incrimination does not excuse a person from answering questions. These powers are intended to facilitate the timely exposure of wrongdoing and prevent further harm.
11.5 Laws abrogating the privilege usually provide use immunity regarding the answers given—that is, they provide that the answers given are not admissible against the person in a subsequent proceeding. Some laws also provide derivative use immunity—that is, they provide that evidence obtained as a result of a person having made a statement is not admissible against the person in a subsequent proceeding. Other statutory safeguards against incrimination may also be provided, including restrictions on sharing the information obtained with law enforcement agencies. The courts also have inherent powers to exclude evidence that would render a trial unfair.
11.6 There have been several reviews of the privilege against self-incrimination and the availability of use immunities to protect witnesses who are compelled to answer questions or produce documents. These reviews largely concluded that use immunities are an appropriate safeguard of individual rights and may, therefore, appropriately justify laws that exclude the privilege against self-incrimination. However, there have been recent developments in the area, including the use of compulsory powers to question a person subject to charge. The High Court has said that such questioning has the potential to ‘fundamentally alter the accusatorial judicial process’. The Court has also expressed concern about the publication of transcripts of examinations to prosecutors.
11.7 The ALRC considers further review of the abrogation of self-incrimination in Commonwealth laws is warranted. Such a review could consider whether the abrogation in more than 40 Commonwealth laws has been sufficiently justified, and if so, what type of immunity is appropriate. It could also consider whether, and in what circumstances, the compulsory examination of persons subject to charge, about the subject matter of the charge, and the publication of transcripts of examinations to prosecutors, is justified.
11.8 The Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) Sch 1 s 353-10 is unusual, in that it abrogates the privilege against self-incrimination, and no use immunity is available. The Commissioner of Taxation may disclose the information provided to a law enforcement agency. Further review should consider whether these laws are appropriately justified, or whether statutory protections should be made available.
X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92,  per Hayne and Bell JJ, Kiefel J agreeing.
Lee v The Queen  HCA 20 (21 May 2014).
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) sch 1 s 353–10; Commissioner of Taxation v De Vonk (1995) 61 FCR 564.
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 355–190.