5.9 Freedom of association is not expressly protected in the Australian Constitution. There is also no free-standing right to association implied in the Constitution. Generally, Australian Parliaments may make laws that encroach on freedom of association.
5.10 This power is subject to general constitutional constraints on the legislative powers of the Commonwealth. For example, in 1951, the High Court ruled that the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950 (Cth) was not a valid exercise of express legislative power, and nor was it valid under an implied power to make laws for the preservation of the Commonwealth and its institutions from internal attack and subversion.
5.11 However, just as there is an implied constitutional right to ‘political communication’, arguably there is also an implied right to ‘political association’. As in the case of political communication, any implied right to ‘political association’ does not protect a personal right, but acts as a restraint on the exercise of legislative power by the Commonwealth.
5.12 The High Court has said that ‘freedom of association to some degree may be a corollary of the freedom of communication formulated in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation’.
5.13 Recognition of this corollary acknowledges the importance of freedom of association to a vibrant democracy. People should be free, generally speaking, to join groups like political parties to lobby for and effect change. Gaudron J in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth said that the
notion of a free society governed in accordance with the principles of representative democracy may entail freedom of movement [and] freedom of association.
5.14 However, in the Australian constitutional context, it seems this right to free association is only a corollary of the right to political communication. The High Court said in Wainohu v New South Wales:
Any freedom of association implied by the Constitution would exist only as a corollary to the implied freedom of political communication and the same test of infringement and validity would apply.
5.15 The effect of this decision, Professors George Williams and David Hume wrote, ‘will be to give freedom of association a limited constitutional vitality’.
The principle of legality
5.16 The principle of legality provides some protection to freedom of association. When interpreting a statute, courts will presume that Parliament did not intend to interfere with freedom of association, unless this intention was made unambiguously clear.
5.17 For example, in Melbourne Corporation v Barry, the High Court found that a by-law, made under a power to regulate traffic and processions, could not prohibit traffic and processions. Higgins J said:
It must be borne in mind that there is this common law right; and that any interference with a common law right cannot be justified except by statute—by express words or necessary implication. If a statute is capable of being interpreted without supposing that it interferes with the common law right, it should be so interpreted.
5.18 In Tajjour v New South Wales (Tajjour) the High Court confirmed that there is no constitutionally implied freedom of association, separate from the implied freedom of political communication. However, Keane J cited High Court authority for the proposition that, at common law, freedom of association is a ‘fundamental aspect of our legal system’.
5.19 In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Haneef (Haneef) the Full Court of the Federal Court approached the construction of the word ‘association’ in the light of common law principles. The Court concluded that those principles tended against a construction authorising the Minister to find a person to have failed a migration character test ‘merely on the basis of an innocent association with persons whom the Minister reasonably suspects have been or are involved in criminal conduct’. The principle of legality, applied to freedom of association, can be seen as an ‘integral part’ of the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation in Haneef.
5.20 International law recognises rights to peaceful assembly and to freedom of association. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides for ‘the right of peaceful assembly’ and the ‘right to freedom of association including the right to form and join trade unions’.
5.21 In addition, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides for the ‘right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice’.
5.22 Australia is also bound to respect freedom of association under international labour standards, and through its membership of the International Labour Organization (ILO). International labour standards seek to guarantee the right of both workers and employers to form and join organisations of their choice.
5.23 International instruments cannot be used to ‘override clear and valid provisions of Australian national law’. However, where a statute is ambiguous, courts will generally favour a construction that accords with Australia’s international obligations.
Bills of rights
5.24 In other countries, bills of rights or human rights statutes provide some protection from statutory encroachment. Freedom of association is protected in the human rights statutes in the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. For example, the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) gives effect to the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, art 11 of which provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
5.25 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution refers to the ‘right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances’.
5.26 Freedom of association is also provided for in the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities and the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181,  (Gummow and Hayne JJ). (‘There is no such ‘free-standing’ right [as freedom of association] to be implied from the Constitution’). See also Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 313 ALR 221; O’Flaherty v City of Sydney Council (2014) 221 FCR 382, ; Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 304 ALR 266.
Under Australian Constitution s 51(xxxix) read with s 61 (incidental and executive powers), s 51(vi) (defence power).
Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1.
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181,  (Gummow and Hayne JJ).This position has been supported in subsequent judgements: O’Flaherty v City of Sydney Council (2014) 221 FCR 382, ; Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 304 ALR 266; Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181,  (Gummow & Hayne JJ); Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181,  (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan & Bell JJ).
Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 212 (Gaudron J).
Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181, .
George Williams and David Hume, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (OUP, 2nd ed, 2013) 217. Williams and Hume go on to write: ‘It would be better to reformulate the position in Wainohu at least so that any freedoms of political association and political movement were identified as derivative, not of freedom of communication, but of the constitutionally prescribed systems of representative and responsible government and for amending the Constitution by referendum. In other words, the Constitution protects that freedom of association and movement which is necessary to sustain the free, genuine choices which the constitutionally prescribed systems contemplate’: Ibid 217–18.
The principle of statutory interpretation now known as the ‘principle of legality’ is discussed more generally in Ch 1.
Melbourne Corporation v Barry (1922) 31 CLR 174, 206.
Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 313 ALR 221, , , –. The case concerning the anti-consorting law contained in s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), which was found not to be invalid for impermissibly burdening the implied freedom of communication under the Constitution.
Ibid . Citing Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 200 (Dixon J).
Under Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(6)(b).
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Haneef (2007) 163 FCR 414, .
Australian Council of Trade Unions, Submission 44.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) arts 21, 22.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) art 8. Williams and Hume stated: ‘the right to freedom of association is recognised in the ICCPR while the right to form trade unions (which can be seen as a subset of the right to freedom of association) is recognised in the ICESCR’: Williams and Hume, above n 15, 4.
See Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 2010) [3.21]–[3.23].
See, eg, International Labour Organization, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, C87 (entered into force 4 July 1950); International Labour Organization, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, C98 (entered into force 18 July 1951). See also International Labour Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998.
Minister for Immigration v B (2004) 219 CLR 365,  (Kirby J).
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 287 (Mason CJ and Deane J). The relevance of international law is discussed more generally in Ch 1.
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42, sch 1 pt I, art 11(1).
Canada Act 1982 c 11 s 2(d).
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 17.The protection provided by bills of rights and human rights acts is discussed more generally in Ch 1.
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42, sch 1 pt I, art 11(1).
United States Constitution amend I.
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 16(2); Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 15(2).