10.11.2010
12.3 An issue for this Inquiry is the extent to which police may threaten to or actually charge a victim with aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring a breach of a protection order where they believe the victim consented to the breach.
12.4 The Commissions have heard that victims in some jurisdictions, including Western Australia (WA),[1] South Australia (SA)[2] and Tasmania[3] and are being charged with aiding and abetting breaches of protection orders or instigating such breaches. The WA review of family violence legislation found that police were sometimes charging victims, who had obtained protection orders and were deemed complicit in a breach of a protection order, with aiding and abetting the breach.[4]
12.5 In 2006, Professor David Brown and other criminal law academics commented that:
Until fairly recently, the long established common law position was that a person could not be convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of an offence of which he or she was the victim. In Tyrell [1894] 1 QB 710, the defendant, a girl under the age of 16, was charged with aiding and abetting the principal to have unlawful sexual intercourse with her. The court found that the defendant could not be guilty of aiding and abetting a crime aimed at protecting girls of her age from sexual intercourse. However, in a number of recent cases, the party for whose benefit an apprehended violence order … was made has been convicted of aiding and abetting the criminal offence of breaching a domestic violence order.[5]
12.6 In Keane v Police, the Supreme Court of SA upheld the conviction of Keane for aiding and abetting the breach of a protection order. The order, protecting Keane, prohibited her partner Smith from being at premises where she resided and from communicating with her in any way. One year after the order was made, Keane telephoned her partner and requested him to look after their children the following day. Arrangements were made for her partner to collect the children from the residence of a third party. However, the partner arrived at Keane’s place, wanting to talk. Keane allowed him in. Her partner became abusive when Keane rejected his attempts at reconciliation. The police attended and both parties were charged—one with breach; the other with aiding and abetting the breach by contacting him and allowing him to enter her home. King AJ stated:
I cannot discern any provision or consideration of policy in the Domestic Violence Act giving rise to an implication excluding ordinary accessorial liability. There are reasons of justice and convenience why the ordinary principles should apply. Where an order is made for a person’s benefit, it would seem unjust that the person should be able to encourage or facilitate a breach of an order thereby causing another to commit an offence, but escape any liability. Moreover, on policy grounds, it is important that curial and police resources should not be wasted in obtaining and enforcing restraining orders, the breach of which the persons for whose benefit they are made, are willing to condone. In the present case, the appellant’s actions, in addition to causing distress to the children, resulted in the police having to come to the house to remove the offender.[6]
12.7 In a study of the policing of protection orders from the perspective of Indigenous women, Loretta Kelly nominates aiding and abetting charges as one manifestation of a bias against women who were known to have reconciled with their partners after a report of violence.[7] She cites the following example:
Thelma was charged with aiding and abetting the defendant’s breach of the AVO against him. When she asked why she was being charged, the police responded: ‘we’re sick of this … you call the police but you’re having him back. Thelma corrected the police: ‘he doesn’t live with me, he just comes back here thinking he owns the place—arguing’. In spite of her response, the police charged her with aiding and abetting.[8]
12.8 One submission to the Victorian Law Reform Commission’s (VLRC) review of family violence laws pointed out:
The threat of being charged with breaching one’s own intervention order is a technique used by perpetrators of family violence to stop the protected person from reporting the breach of the order.[9]
12.9 Both the New South Wales (NSW) Law Reform Commission and the VLRC have recommended against charging victims for whose benefit a protection order has been obtained for aiding and abetting a breach of such an order.[10] The VLRC recommended that if the police believe that a victim has consented to a breach, they should explain the procedure for varying or revoking an order. If necessary, police should apply for a variation or revocation on behalf of the victim with his or her consent.[11] The WA review recommended an amendment to the Criminal Code (WA) to preclude victims for whose benefit a protection order has been made from being charged with aiding and abetting a breach of the order.[12] It also recommended that the court should be given power to grant leave to proceed in an application to vary or cancel a protection order, of its own motion, at the hearing of an allegation of a breach, where there is evidence of the person protected being complicit.[13]
12.10 NSW family violence legislation provides that a victim for whose benefit a protection order is obtained cannot be charged with aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the breach of a protection order.[14] The Victorian family violence legislation provides that a ‘protected person’ does not aid, abet, counsel or procure a breach because the protected person ‘encourages, permits or authorises conduct by the respondent’ that contravenes a protection order.[15] That Act provides, for example, that a protected person is not guilty of aiding or abetting a breach because she or he ‘invited the respondent to have access to the residence’ or ‘allowed the respondent to spend time with the protected person’ in breach of a protection order. The Victorian Act also contains a note stating that, if a victim is dissatisfied with the terms of a protection order, the victim or the police may apply to have the order varied or revoked.[16]
12.11 The family violence legislation of SA provides that a victim for whose benefit a protection order has been made cannot be guilty of aiding and abetting a breach of the order if
the conduct constituting contravention of the intervention order did not constitute contravention of the order in respect of another person protected by the order or of any other intervention order (of which the person was or ought reasonably to have been aware) in force against the defendant and protecting another person.[17]
Submissions and consultations
Aid and abet provisions
12.12 In the Consultation Paper, the Commissions proposed that state and territory legislation should be amended, where necessary, to provide that a person protected by a protection order under family violence legislation cannot be charged with or be found guilty of an offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the breach of a protection order.[18]
12.13 This proposal was broadly supported by the majority of stakeholders,[19] although as set out below some stakeholders expressed dissent.
12.14 In addition to agreeing with the reasons set out in the Consultation Paper,[20] stakeholders advanced the following reasons for their support:
It is the responsibility of the person against whom an order is made to adhere to its conditions. It is not the responsibility of the victim to ensure that it is not breached.[21]
Any evidence that a victim has played a role in the breach of a protection order is more appropriately taken into account in proceedings against the person who breached the order, rather than forming the basis for proceedings against the victim.[22]
12.15 The North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency (NAAJA) expressed the view that charging victims will not achieve anything, nor address the issues that parties are having, and emphasised the counter-productive consequences of excessive recourse to punitive criminal sanctions. It also stated:
Our concern with charging a party with aiding and abetting is that it oversimplifies a situation and does not take account of all of the factors that may lead a person to aid or abet a breach, such as that the victim (just as with the respondent) does not fully understand the exact terms of a domestic violence order. These factors are especially pressing in the cases of parties who speak English as a second, third or fourth language or who lack the functional English literacy skills to understand the complex English used in domestic violence orders. There are also instances where a victim may aid or abet a breach due to psychological manipulations. As there are instances when the order has been taken out not so much at the victim’s request, but at the instigation of a third party (such as police).[23]
We would be concerned that a policy of charging people with aiding and abetting in any of these circumstances would result in unjust prosecutions.[24]
12.16 One legal service provider also supported the proposal on the basis that charging victims for breach of a protection order would have particularly negative ramifications for Indigenous women in remote communities, due to a number of factors including that many Indigenous women:
have an order imposed by police application and may not have consented to its issue;
have difficulty in understanding the legal process, including the consequences of a protection order, given that English may not be their first language, and there is a lack of access to persons to explain legal processes as magistrates may only be available once per month in remote community courts; and
have significant pressure put on them from their extended family and community ‘not to get Indigenous men in trouble with the law’ and so ‘may not be in a position to tell the defendant to go away even with the [protection order] in place’.[25]
12.17 One Tasmanian magistrate expressed concern that charging victims for instigating breach of protection orders could deter them from reporting family violence in the future[26]—a concern echoed by NAAJA.[27]
12.18 The Queensland Law Society, which supported the proposal, noted that
anecdotally, clients have reported threats of these prosecutions have arisen in cases of no contact clauses where the victim has spoken to the perpetrator.[28]
12.19 In contrast, a number of stakeholders opposed the proposal.[29] National Legal Aid opposed the proposal although it stated that a number of women have been charged in WA with being parties to breach of a protection order in cases where
it was apparent that the woman was a genuine victim of family violence and the threat or reality of charges only served to undermine their confidence in the legal/justice system.[30]
12.20 National Legal Aid provided the following case study to illustrate this point:
An Aboriginal woman living in the Pilbara had been in a long-term violent relationship. After being physically assaulted again, she obtained an interim violence restraining order against her partner on the advice of the police. Some weeks later after pressure from extended family and her children she allowed her partner to attend her house to see the children. Her partner again assaulted her and the police were called to the house. The police charged her partner with assault and breach of the restraining order. The woman was also charged with breach of restraining order as a party to the offence. She pleaded guilty and was given a fine. She remarked to the refuge that she would never seek a protection order again.[31]
12.21 National Legal Aid identified a further problem with protected persons being charged with breaches—they are potentially liable ‘to receive a record for a violent offence with all the potential consequences. Any criminal record is unlikely to specify that the person is a protected person charged as being party to a breach’.[32]
12.22 Despite these concerns, National Legal Aid expressed the views of the Legal Aid Commission Tasmania in opposing the proposal—views which were substantially echoed by the Department of Premier and Cabinet (Tas). In summary, both submissions noted that the benefits of the system in place in Tasmania under the Safe at Home program which allows, in appropriate cases, victims who invite or encourage a respondent to breach a protection order to be charged with ‘Commit Simple Offence’.
The penalties are, legislatively and in practice, less than those imposed for the actual breach. Most often no conviction is imposed on an undertaking not to commit a similar offence for 6 or 12 months. This reflects, and provides an opportunity to explain to the protected person, the importance of a number of points, …
orders have the effect of limiting someone’s freedom, to a greater or lesser degree. … If you have the benefit of a protection order that limits someone else’s freedom, you have the responsibility not to do anything that invites or encourages a breach of that order; …
orders can usually be changed to allow the protected person to do what needs to be done. It is, however, a process, and takes time. There may need to be a good, objective reason to think that things have changed before the order can be changed;
when there are children in the household … the order is in place not just to protect the protected person, but also to protect children from witnessing or being caught up in any more incidents of family violence and suffering harm. By undermining the effectiveness of the order, a victim may be seen to be exposing the children to risk of harm.[33]
12.23 The Law Society of New South Wales submitted that police should have the option to charge in exceptional circumstances.[34]
12.24 Toni Maclean, a partner violence counsellor opposed the proposal, submitting that:
This is a situation which I encountered repeatedly as a case manager for NSW Community Offender Services. Female victims of partner violence, for a range of reasons, were frequently observed to encourage the offending partner in actions which put the offender in breach of the protection order.[35]
12.25 The One in Three Campaign submitted that the proposal
appears to ignore the serious issue of malicious aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring of the breach of a protection order. We have heard many reports of persons who have breached a protection order after the person protected by such an order maliciously aided and abetted its breach with the intent of harming the other person.[36]
Variation or revocation of protection order in proceedings for breach
12.26 In the Consultation Paper, the Commissions proposed that state and territory family violence legislation should empower a court hearing an allegation of breach of a protection order to grant leave to proceed in an application to vary or cancel the protection order of its own motion where: (a) there is evidence that the victim for whose benefit the protection order was made gave free and voluntary consent to the breach; and (b) the court is satisfied that the victim wants to vary or revoke the protection order.[37]
12.27 Stakeholder views on this proposal were divided. Many stakeholders—including a number of legal service providers that made confidential submissions—expressed support.[38] Others expressed qualified support including on the basis that the same tests for varying or revoking a protection order are applied,[39] the court is satisfied that the victim has not been coerced, intimidated or otherwise manipulated,[40] and has indeed explicitly consented.[41]
12.28 For example, National Legal Aid submitted that it would support the proposal on the basis that
there is an appropriate process to ensure that the consent of the victim is truly consent and the court could still make orders that are necessary and desirable to protect the victim and any affected children from further violence.[42]
12.29 One confidential submission stated:
The idea of free and voluntary consent when we are discussing victims of domestic and family violence is not entirely accurate and courts should not cancel protection orders without first taking into account the dynamic of power and control that exists within these relationships. Cancelling or amending a protection order should be done with care and consideration and support should be provided to the protected person to ensure that her voice is heard away from the perpetrator of such violence.[43]
12.30 The Aboriginal Family Violence Prevention and Legal Service Victoria submitted that ‘there should be an obligation to refer the victim for independent legal advice’ to allow the Court to satisfy itself that there is no duress involved.[44] Berry Street Inc, in expressing reservations about the proposal due to the possibility of victim coercion, stated that ‘a more cautious approach would be to counsel and support a victim to apply for a variation or to revoke the protection order if that is their preferred course of action’.[45]
12.31 A few stakeholders opposed the proposal. Legal Aid NSW submitted:
If the defendant is found guilty of breaching a protection order, the fact that the victim may have consented to the breach or wishes to vary the order does not modify the fact that the defendant is guilty and should take responsibility for those actions. If the victim wants to vary or revoke the order they can make a separate application to do so and it is not appropriate to consider varying or revoking the order whilst hearing an allegation regarding a breach of that order.[46]
12.32 Women’s Legal Services NSW expressed concern that
providing the court with this power would place a victim at risk of being pressured, in the midst of a hearing to agree to changes in a protection order that are not in their best interests.[47]
12.33 The Victorian Government queried that part of the proposal regarding ‘consent of a victim to a breach’ as the order is between the court and the respondent.[48]
12.34 While not specifically addressing the proposal, NAAJA highlighted difficulties that arise, especially in remote communities, with regard to the variation and revocation of protection orders:
Parties often reconcile and resume their relationship without amending or seeking the revocation of an order that prohibits contact. Parties often lack the knowledge of what steps they need to take to seek a variation or revocation of the order. They have no culturally-appropriate legal services that they can seek advice or assistance from. Or they are so alienated and disenfranchised from the conventional court process that they would rather run the risk of breaching an order than voluntarily attend court to bring an application to vary or revoke an order.
An additional issue contributing to this problem is the infrequency with which courts sit in remote communities. A bush court may sit on a monthly, bi-monthly or three monthly basis. This means that it is simply [impossible] for remote residents to seek variations of orders in a timely manner. This again leaves defendants open to breaching orders.[49]
Commissions’ views
Aid and abet provisions
12.35 On balance, the Commissions remain of the view that relevant state and territory legislation—whether family violence legislation or criminal legislation—should be amended to provide that a person protected by a protection order under family violence legislation cannot be charged with, be or found guilty of, an offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the breach of such an order.
12.36 The capacity to charge victims of family violence for breach of a protection order undermines the policy intent of family violence legislation.[50] As stated by Brown and other criminal law academics:
While the frustration and concern for ‘wasted resources’ on the part of police can be appreciated, it is questionable whether the practice of laying breach charges against the person for whose benefit the order has been made is likely to advance the preventative objective of apprehended violence laws. The risk of being charged as an accessory to breach is likely to represent a significant disincentive to victims of domestic violence who are considering applying for an order.[51]
12.37 Charging victims of family violence for aiding and abetting breaches of orders exposes them to further traumatisation, potentially imposing a further form of abuse and undermining their confidence in the legal system. It may deter victims from reporting future occurrences of family violence, and may also have particular deleterious outcomes for Indigenous victims of family violence.
12.38 Moreover, it is inappropriate to charge a victim with aiding and abetting breaches of protection orders because it overshadows the fact that a protection order is made against a person who uses family violence—not the victim.
12.39 In coming to this view the Commissions have considered the concerns expressed by the One in Three Campaign about instances of victims maliciously inducing a breach of a protection order. Empirically, the Commissions are unaware of the frequency with which victims do so. On one view, whether such occurrences are exceptional or more frequent does not detract from the position that there should be some form of recourse within the law to deal with such situations.
12.40 One option to address this concern would be to create an offence of maliciously inducing a breach of a protection order. The offence would need to be tightly defined to cover situations where the victim intentionally sought to induce a breach of a protection order accompanied by malice or an intention to subvert the order of the court. Its creation would not be intended to cover ambiguous situations where a victim may have initiated or acquiesced to contact for non-malicious reasons, such as attempting reconciliation or bowing to pressure from extended family or friends to give the person the subject of the order another chance, or through lack of understanding of the legal process. Rather, the intention of creating such an offence would be to preserve the option of charging victims in those exceptional situations where victims seek to abuse the criminal justice system.
12.41 However, the Commissions have reservations about the creation of such an offence at this time. First and foremost, they are concerned that the creation of such an offence may create a significant risk that, in practice, victims will be charged in inappropriate cases. In expressing this concern, the Commissions note the comments of National Legal Aid about the inappropriate laying of charges of accessorial liability on genuine victims of family violence in WA.
12.42 Second, the Commissions are not presently convinced that the creation of such an offence is necessary, in light of the fact that there are existing criminal offences directed at the abuse of the criminal justice system, such as public justice offences concerning perverting the course of justice—for example, committing ‘acts or omissions with intent in any way whatever to obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the due course of justice or the administration of the law’[52]—which may be utilised in situations, for example, where a victim maliciously induces a breach of a protection order with the specific intention of having the person subject to the conditions of the order charged with its breach. There are also offences such as making false accusations,[53] conspiring to bring false accusations,[54] fabricating evidence,[55] or giving false evidence or making a false statement,[56] which may also have a role to play in cases of malicious behaviour.
12.43 It may be appropriate, however, for a charge of aiding and abetting a breach to be laid against persons other than the victim for whose benefit a protection order is made. For example, the SA family violence legislation provides that if a protection order prohibits a ‘defendant from being on rented premises at which a protected person resides’ and the landlord had been notified of the prohibition, the landlord is guilty of an offence if he or she assists the defendant to access those premises.[57]
Variation or revocation of protection order in proceedings for breach
12.44 The Commissions acknowledge the concerns expressed by stakeholders about empowering a court to vary or revoke a protection order when hearing an allegation of breach of a protection order in circumstances where there is evidence that the victim has given free and voluntary consent to the conduct constituting breach, and the court is satisfied that the victim would like to vary or revoke the order.
12.45 The Commissions agree that applications to vary or revoke protection orders should be considered separately from hearings concerning breach of protection orders, and that conflating the two issues may risk victims being pressured to agree to variations or revocations which are not in their best interests. Accordingly, the Commissions do not make a recommendation in this regard.
12.46 However, the Commissions emphasise that, in appropriate circumstances, family violence advocates and services should support and counsel victims to apply for variations or revocations where: that course of action represents the outcome that they genuinely wish for; is in their best interests; and is uninfluenced by coercion or control on the part of persons against whom protection orders were made.
Recommendation 12–1 State and territory legislation should provide that a person protected by a protection order under family violence legislation cannot be charged with or found guilty of an offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the breach of a protection order.
[1] National Legal Aid, Submission FV 232, 15 July 2010.
[2] A Cannon, Submission FV 137, 23 June 2010.
[3] Magistrates Court, Consultation, Hobart, 13 May 2010.
[4] Department of the Attorney General (WA), A Review of Part 2 Division 3A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (2008), 32–33.
[5] D Brown and others, Brown, Farrier, Neal and Weisbrot’s Criminal Laws: Material and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process in New South Wales (4th ed, 2006), 1156.
[6]Keane v Police (1997) 69 SASR 481, 484.
[7] L Kelly, ‘Indigenous Women’s Stories Speak for Themselves: The Policing of Apprehended Violence Orders’ (1999) 4(25) Indigenous Law Bulletin 89, 4, 5.
[8] Ibid, 5.
[9] Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of Family Violence Laws: Report (2006), 162.
[10] New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Apprehended Violence Orders, Report 103 (2003), Rec 45; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of Family Violence Laws: Report (2006), Rec 33.
[11] Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of Family Violence Laws: Report (2006), Rec 33.
[12] Department of the Attorney General (WA), A Review of Part 2 Division 3A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (2008), 33.
[13] Ibid, Rec 6.
[14]Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s 14(7).
[15]Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) s 125.
[16] Ibid note to s 125.
[17]Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) s 31(3).
[18] Australian Law Reform Commission and New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Family Violence: Improving Legal Frameworks, ALRC Consultation Paper 1, NSWLRC Consultation Paper 9 (2010), Proposal 6–13.
[19] Women’s Legal Services Australia, Submission FV 225, 6 July 2010; Legal Aid NSW, Submission FV 219, 1 July 2010; North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission FV 194, 25 June 2010; J Stubbs, Submission FV 186, 25 June 2010; Women’s Legal Service Queensland, Submission FV 185, 25 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 184, 25 June 2010; Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission FV 182, 25 June 2010; Queensland Law Society, Submission FV 178, 25 June 2010; Peninsula Community Legal Centre, Submission FV 174, 25 June 2010; Aboriginal Family Violence Prevention and Legal Service Victoria, Submission FV 173, 25 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 164, 25 June 2010; Berry Street Inc, Submission FV 163, 25 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 162, 25 June 2010; The Central Australian Aboriginal Family Legal Unit Aboriginal Corporation, Submission FV 149, 25 June 2010; Justice for Children, Submission FV 148, 24 June 2010; Domestic Violence Victoria, Federation of Community Legal Centres Victoria, Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Victorian Women with Disabilities Network, Submission FV 146, 24 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 130, 21 June 2010; A Cannon, Submission FV 137, 23 June 2010; Domestic Violence Prevention Council (ACT), Submission FV 124, 18 June 2010; Victorian Government, Submission FV 120, 15 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 105, 6 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 96, 2 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 77, 2 June 2010; Women’s Domestic Violence Court Advocacy Service Network, Submission FV 46, 24 May 2010.
[20] Domestic Violence Victoria, Federation of Community Legal Centres Victoria, Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Victorian Women with Disabilities Network, Submission FV 146, 24 June 2010.
[21] Legal Aid NSW, Submission FV 219, 1 July 2010; Women’s Domestic Violence Court Advocacy Service Network, Submission FV 46, 24 May 2010.
[22] Legal Aid NSW, Submission FV 219, 1 July 2010. A magistrate also expressed the view that a court should be able to take the conduct of the victim into account on sentencing for breach of an order: A Cannon, Submission FV 137, 23 June 2010.
[23] The concern about the impact of such a provision on victims when they may not have had a say in an order being issued was echoed in another consultation: Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission, Consultation, Darwin, 26 May 2010.
[24] North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission FV 194, 25 June 2010.
[25] Confidential, Submission FV 164, 25 June 2010.
[26] Magistrates Court, Consultation, Hobart, 13 May 2010.
[27] North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission FV 194, 25 June 2010.
[28] Queensland Law Society, Submission FV 178, 25 June 2010.
[29] Department of Premier and Cabinet (Tas), Submission FV 236, 20 July 2010; National Legal Aid, Submission FV 232, 15 July 2010; Law Society of New South Wales, Submission FV 205, 30 June 2010; T McLean, Submission FV 204, 28 June 2010; One in Three Campaign, Submission FV 35, 12 May 2010.
[30] National Legal Aid, Submission FV 232, 15 July 2010.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid. See also Department of Premier and Cabinet (Tas), Submission FV 236, 20 July 2010.
[34] Law Society of New South Wales, Submission FV 205, 30 June 2010.
[35] T McLean, Submission FV 204, 28 June 2010.
[36] One in Three Campaign, Submission FV 35, 12 May 2010.
[37] Consultation Paper, Proposal 6–14.
[38] J Stubbs, Submission FV 186, 25 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 183, 25 June 2010; Peninsula Community Legal Centre, Submission FV 174, 25 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 162, 25 June 2010; Domestic Violence Victoria, Federation of Community Legal Centres Victoria, Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Victorian Women with Disabilities Network, Submission FV 146, 24 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 130, 21 June 2010; N Ross, Submission FV 129, 21 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 81, 2 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 77, 2 June 2010.
[39] Queensland Law Society, Submission FV 178, 25 June 2010. This submission pointed out, for example, that Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1989 (Qld) s 36, significantly, only allows a court to revoke a protection order if the court considers the safety of the aggrieved or a named person would not be compromised by the revocation.
[40] T McLean, Submission FV 204, 28 June 2010; Women’s Legal Service Queensland, Submission FV 185, 25 June 2010; Confidential, Submission FV 96, 2 June 2010.
[41] Confidential, Submission FV 164, 25 June 2010.
[42] National Legal Aid, Submission FV 232, 15 July 2010. A similar view was expressed in Department of Premier and Cabinet (Tas), Submission FV 236, 20 July 2010.
[43] Confidential, Submission FV 184, 25 June 2010.
[44] Aboriginal Family Violence Prevention and Legal Service Victoria, Submission FV 173, 25 June 2010.
[45] Berry Street Inc, Submission FV 163, 25 June 2010.
[46] Legal Aid NSW, Submission FV 219, 1 July 2010.
[47] Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission FV 182, 25 June 2010.
[48] Victorian Government, Submission FV 120, 15 June 2010.
[49] North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission FV 194, 25 June 2010.
[50] The purposes of family violence legislation are discussed in Ch 4.
[51] D Brown and others, Brown, Farrier, Neal and Weisbrot’s Criminal Laws: Material and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process in New South Wales (4th ed, 2006), 1157.
[52]Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 105. See also Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 312, 319.
[53] See, eg, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 314.
[54] See, eg, Criminal Code Act Compilation 1913 (WA) s 134.
[55] See, eg, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 317(b); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 97.
[56] See, eg, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 327, 330.
[57]Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) s 32.