Initial and subsequent disclosures

6.128   Most secrecy provisions regulate the initial unauthorised disclosure of Commonwealth information. As McGinness has noted, however, this can give rise to problems:

Where a secrecy provision permits disclosure to other government agencies then, in the absence of a specific provision, the persons receiving the information are not bound by that statute to maintain its confidentiality … Some secrecy provisions attempt to deal with this by imposing a further prohibition on disclosure by recipients.[124]

6.129   As noted in Chapter 3, a number of existing secrecy provisions regulate both the initial disclosure, whether authorised or unauthorised, and any subsequent unauthorised disclosure of Commonwealth information. For example, s 8XB(1) of the Taxation Administration Act provides in part that a person shall not use or disclose taxation information that the person has obtained in breach of a provision of a taxation law. Section 8XB(2) provides that:

Without limiting subsection (1), a person shall be taken to have obtained taxation information in breach of a provision of a taxation law if:

(a)  the information relates to the affairs of another person;

(b)  the form or circumstances in which the information was obtained would have led a reasonable person to believe that:

(i)       in the case of information contained in a document—the document had come from an office of the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner; or

(ii)      in any other case—the information had come from the records of the Commissioner or from an officer; and

(c)  the information was obtained by the person in circumstances that gave the person no reasonable cause to believe that the communication of the information to the person was authorised by a taxation law or by a person acting in accordance with such a law.

6.130   The Tax Laws Exposure Draft Bill proposes to regulate both initial and subsequent disclosures through three separate offences to address:

  • ·                the unauthorised disclosure of taxpayer information by current and former taxation officers;

  • ·                the unauthorised disclosure of taxpayer information by individuals who receive the information as a result of a lawful disclosure; and

  • ·                the unauthorised disclosure of taxpayer information by individuals who receive the information as a result of an unlawful disclosure.[125]

6.131   The proposed taxation provisions stipulate that an individual does not commit an offence if the information was obtained with authority—that is, under one of the disclosure exceptions—and the information is subsequently disclosed for, or in connection with, the original purpose of disclosure.[126] However, an offence is committed where the subsequent disclosure does not fall within one of the exceptions to the prohibition on disclosure.[127] The following example is provided in the Explanatory Material:

Paul, an employee of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, receives taxpayer information from the ATO for the purposes of administering the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (SIS Act). Paul discloses the information to a journalist and to another Australian Prudential Regulation Authority employee for a purpose that is unconnected to the administration of the SIS Act. In both cases, the disclosure of the information is an offence.[128]

6.132   Section 79(3) of the Crimes Act applies to any person who discloses prescribed information where the information has come to them in certain circumstances. These circumstances are set out in 79(1), and include where information:

has been entrusted to the person by a Commonwealth officer or a person holding office under the Queen or he or she has made or obtained it owing to his or her position as a person:

(i)              who is or has been a Commonwealth officer;

(ii)            who holds or has held office under the Queen;

(iii)           who holds or has held a contract made on behalf of the Queen or the Commonwealth;

(iv)           who is or has been employed by or under a person to whom a preceding subparagraph applies; or

(v)            acting with the permission of a Minister;

and, by reason of its nature or the circumstances under which it was entrusted to him or her or it was made or obtained by him or her or for any other reason, it is his or her duty to treat it as secret ...

6.133   This provision extends liability for disclosure of Commonwealth information beyond Commonwealth officers, office holders and contractors to include any person—including, potentially, a journalist—who acquires such information in circumstances which give rise to a duty to treat the information as secret. As discussed in detail, below, the ALRC recommends that, in some circumstances, the subsequent disclosure of Commonwealth information by any person who receives the information in confidence or knowing, or reckless as to whether, the information has been disclosed in breach of the general secrecy offence should also be an offence.[129]

6.134   The Franks Committee expressed the view that:

Our general approach has been to identify that official information which requires protection because it is genuinely secret. Whoever lets out such a secret, the same damage is done to the nation. Every citizen who knowingly handles a secret of this kind ought to protect it. If a civil servant has failed to protect a secret, there is no justification for the view that a citizen who thereby comes into possession of that secret, and who knows that it is a secret, should be free to compound the failure of the civil servant, and to harm the nation, by passing on the secret as he pleases.[130]

6.135   The Committee noted that while public servants have a clear public duty to safeguard official information, others are not subject to the same duty. Thus, others should not be subject to criminal sanctions unless they are aware that they have come into possession of secret information or the circumstances are such that they should clearly be aware of this:

If the citizen knows that he is in possession of a secret but chooses nevertheless to disclose it, it is then reasonable that he should be liable to criminal penalties. The imposition of legal liability on the citizen is equitable, as well as being necessary for the protection of the nation on two conditions. The first is that the law should be strictly confined to what is genuinely secret. The second is that it should clearly specify that the citizen must be proved to have had guilty knowledge.[131]

6.136   The Official Secrets Act 1989 (UK) includes a provision prohibiting the disclosure of information that has come into a person’s possession as the result of an unauthorised disclosure, or where it has been entrusted to the person ‘on terms requiring it to be held in confidence’. In order to commit the offence the person must know, or have reasonable grounds to believe, that the information is protected by the provisions of the Act and that it has come into his or her possession in the circumstances set out above.[132]

6.137   When Commonwealth information is disclosed by a third party without authority, the action for breach of confidence may provide a remedy. An action for breach of confidence can be brought against a third party who has received confidential information. The information may have been communicated in breach of a duty of confidence,[133] or may have come into the hands of the third party by human error.[134] An action can be brought against a third party to whom information has been communicated in breach of a duty of confidence where that third party was aware, or should reasonably have been aware, that the information was confidential.[135]

6.138   While an action for breach of confidence may provide some protection for confidential information, in 1995, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs report, In Confidence: A Report of the Inquiry into the Protection of Confidential Personal and Commercial Information Held by the Commonwealth, expressed the view that secrecy offence provisions should prohibit unauthorised dealing in confidential third party information at every point in the ‘distribution chain’, where there was the requisite mental element.[136]

6.139   The earlier Review of the Commonwealth Criminal Law, by a committee chaired by Sir Harry Gibbs (the Gibbs Committee), recommended that Australian legislation should follow the model provided by the UK Official Secrets Act, and include a provision prohibiting subsequent unauthorised disclosures. The Gibbs Committee recommended the following form of words for the offence:

[W]here a person knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe, that information—

(i)       had been disclosed (whether to him or another) by a Commonwealth officer or government contractor without authority or had been unlawfully obtained from either such person; or

(ii)     had been entrusted to him or her in confidence by such officer or contractor on terms requiring it to be held in confidence; or

(iii)    had been disclosed (whether to him or another) without lawful authority by a person to whom it had been entrusted as in (ii);

it would be an offence for the person to disclose the information without authority, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe, that the disclosure would be damaging.[137]

6.140   In IP 34, the ALRC asked whether secrecy provisions should, as a matter of course, include offences dealing with both the initial unauthorised handling of information and any subsequent disclosures.[138] There was significant support in submissions for covering both initial and subsequent unauthorised disclosures, in particular, where the person making the subsequent unauthorised disclosure knew, or was reckless as to whether, the information had been initially disclosed without authority.[139]

6.141   In DP 74, the ALRC proposed that unauthorised disclosure by current and former Commonwealth officers be covered by the general secrecy offence, which applied to all Commonwealth officers, including Commonwealth contracted service providers. Thus, all disclosures between Commonwealth agencies, and between agencies and their contractors, were to be covered by the general secrecy offence. The proposed subsequent disclosure offence was to cover unauthorised disclosures by other people where:

  • ·                information was disclosed by a Commonwealth officer in breach of the proposed general secrecy offence;

  • ·                the person knew, or was reckless as to whether, the information had been disclosed in breach of the proposed general secrecy offence; and

  • ·                the person knew, intended, or was reckless as to whether, the subsequent disclosure of the information would harm, or was reasonably likely to harm, one of the public interests protected by the general secrecy offence.[140]

6.142   The ALRC did not propose an offence to cover unauthorised disclosure of information by individuals who receive the information as a result of a lawful disclosure, although the ALRC did seek stakeholder views on this issue. The ALRC’s preliminary view was that, where a Commonwealth officer discloses Commonwealth information with authority to a person or entity that is not a Commonwealth officer—for example, a state or territory public service agency or official, a foreign government, or a private sector organisation—the Commonwealth has the opportunity to ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place, or are put in place, to protect the information. For example, state and territory officers are usually subject to state and territory secrecy provisions,[141] or specific Commonwealth secrecy provisions. Intergovernmental or inter-agency agreements or contractual arrangements could be put in place with state and territory governments and agencies, foreign governments, and private sector organisations. The equitable action for breach of confidence may also be available in some circumstances.[142]

Submissions and consultations

Support for the subsequent disclosure offence

6.143   In response to IP 34, the AGD submitted that:

Arguably, if information is sensitive and it is in the public interest for it to be protected from unauthorised disclosure, then it may be appropriate to regulate both initial and subsequent unauthorised disclosure. It would be important to ensure that this did not cover inadvertent or unintentional disclosures by the second person. It may be appropriate for any offence of subsequent unauthorised disclosure to include additional elements requiring proof that the person knew, or was aware of the substantial risk, that the information was provided to them in breach of the law and that they had reason to believe that they should not further disclose the information. Consideration might also be given to cases where a person knows, or is aware of the substantial risk, that disclosure might cause harm, but has not necessarily turned his or her mind to whether the initial disclosure was lawful or not.[143]

6.144   A number of stakeholders expressed broad support for a subsequent disclosure offence.[144] The AIC was also supportive, noting that if the proposed offence did not go ahead in relation to the general secrecy offence:

the AIC submits that a subsequent disclosure offence should be added to the ASIO Act and the [Intelligence Services Act] and to any new secrecy offences relevant to ONA and DIO due to the serious harm caused by subsequent disclosure of AIC information.[145]

6.145   The ATO’s view was that ‘it is critical that information which has been disclosed in breach of a secrecy provision remains confidential’. The ATO expressed concern, however, that the requirement that the person know, intend, or be reckless as to whether the subsequent disclosure would cause harm would limit the utility of the proposed offence.[146]

6.146   The Treasury expressed support for the proposal to create an offence for subsequent disclosure noting that the Tax Laws Exposure Draft Bill regulates the subsequent disclosure of information obtained lawfully, as well as unlawfully. The Treasury commented that this was possible and desirable in the taxation context because the Tax Laws Exposure Draft Bill clearly identifies the circumstances in which tax information may be disclosed, usually in terms of the agency to which information can be disclosed and the purpose for which the information may be disclosed:

Given that these disclosures are limited to particular purposes, there would be an understandable expectation that these limitations would continue to apply. Otherwise the initial limitations on disclosure by the ATO would arguably be of little importance.[147]

6.147   The Treasury suggested, however, that this rationale may not apply to the general secrecy offence:

The Tax Secrecy Bill proposes to impose limitations on the on-disclosure of taxpayer information by clearly distinguishing between ‘tax officers’ and ‘non taxation officers’ who are in receipt of information lawfully. In the general context, imposing limitations on ‘non-Commonwealth officers’ might have limited effect given most lawful disclosures would likely occur between Commonwealth agencies. In relation to disclosures to non-Commonwealth officers, as the discussion paper notes, this may be more usefully addressed through agreements or, as in the case of the proposed Tax Secrecy Bill, through agency specific secrecy provisions.[148]

6.148   A number of other agencies, however, submitted that the subsequent disclosure offence should cover subsequent unauthorised disclosures of information that was initially disclosed lawfully.[149] The AIC expressed support for the Gibbs Committee recommendations and suggested that the offence should cover unauthorised disclosure of information by a person where the information has been entrusted to that person in confidence.[150]

6.149   The AGD drew attention to the increased need to share information with parties outside the Australian Government such as state and territory governments and the private sector and stated that the current reliance on state and territory secrecy provisions and administrative arrangements did not provide a consistent level of protection for Commonwealth information. The AGD also considered that it was not sufficient to rely on commercial arrangements with the private sector. The AGD was firmly of the view that the proposed offence provisions should cover unauthorised disclosures of information received ‘lawfully from a Commonwealth officer for a specified purpose’:

Without this, there will be no protection provided to Commonwealth information under the proposed general secrecy offence where the information was on-disclosed by an individual not covered by the definition of Commonwealth officer. …

The terms of reference for this inquiry note the desirability of having comprehensive, consistent and workable laws and practices in relation to the protection of Commonwealth information. A general secrecy offence regulating the disclosure of Commonwealth information regardless of where that disclosure occurs or who discloses that information would provide certainty for those disclosing and receiving information. This approach would also achieve a level of uniformity in the protection of Commonwealth information nationally.[151]

Opposition to the subsequent disclosure offence

6.150   CLA did not support the proposed subsequent disclosure offence:

CLA disagrees with the ALRC’s view that where a journalist is aware that a Commonwealth officer has disclosed Commonwealth information in breach of the general offence and the journalist knows, intends, or is reckless as to whether, subsequent disclosure will harm, or is reasonably likely to harm, one of the identified public interests, that it is reasonable to impose criminal sanctions for subsequent disclosure.[152]

6.151   CLA noted that the legislative, administrative and employment obligations imposed on Commonwealth officers are different to the responsibilities of journalists. In CLA’s view it would be inappropriate to impose on journalists sanctions similar to those imposed on public servants, because journalists are not subject to the same obligations. In addition, CLA stated that the proposed provision would unreasonably limit journalists’ discretion.[153]

6.152   The Australian Press Council agreed, stating that:

The Council is particularly concerned with the impact of the proposed subsequent disclosure offence on media professionals. The importance of a public interest defence in such matters is paramount. Whether or not comprehensive public interest disclosure legislation is eventually approved by the Parliament, the Council submits that a public interest defence needs to be an integral part of the proposed subsequent disclosure offence.[154]

6.153   The Australian Press Council asserted that in many, if not most instances ‘when the media publish information that has been leaked from government, there is some element of public interest involved’:

A journalist will have a different set of professional obligations and does not have the same training in information assessment. This raises difficulties, which need to be considered when framing secrecy legislation. Because media professionals are not subject to the disciplinary processes, which are available in relation to public servants, a situation may arise where a minor disclosure that is ostensibly in the public interest is treated as a breach of secrecy warranting criminal conviction. By contrast, a public servant making a disclosure of the same information for the same purpose might instead be disciplined by way of a range of internal mechanisms, even though the duty breached is arguably a higher one than that breached by the journalist.[155]

6.154   The Press Council suggested that secrecy provisions should expressly provide for unauthorised disclosures to journalists. It noted that the conduct of media organisations ‘in the course of journalism’ is exempt from the National Privacy Principles in the Privacy Act on condition that the organisation is publicly committed to observe published privacy standards. The Press Council suggested that a similar exemption could operate in relation to secrecy provisions where media organisations were committed to a set of standards dealing with the handling of confidential government information:

Such standards would specify that journalists must not publish government information that they know to be confidential unless there is a sincerely held belief that publication would be in the public interest. The Press Council would be willing to cooperate with government agencies in the drafting of appropriate standards.[156]

6.155   Other stakeholders also expressed concern about the proposed subsequent disclosure offence,[157] particularly in the absence of a robust whistleblower regime.[158]

ALRC’s views

6.156   As noted above, the Tax Laws Exposure Draft Bill addresses three different situations: the unauthorised disclosure of information by current and former taxation officers; the unauthorised disclosure of information by individuals who receive the information as a result of an unlawful disclosure; and the unauthorised disclosure of information by individuals who receive the information as a result of a lawful disclosure.[159] The second and third of these proposed offences endeavour to deal with the subsequent unauthorised disclosure of taxation information.

6.157   Although most existing secrecy provisions do not seek to address subsequent unauthorised disclosures, the ALRC sees merit in subsequent disclosure offence provisions in two limited circumstances.

6.158   First, the ALRC recommends that a subsequent disclosure offence should apply where a person receives Commonwealth information knowing, or reckless as to whether, the information has been disclosed in breach of the general secrecy offence, and then intentionally discloses that information knowing, intending, or reckless as to whether, the disclosure would harm one of the essential public interests identified in Chapter 5.

6.159   In DP 74, the ALRC did not propose to cover unauthorised disclosure of information by individuals who receive the information as a result of a lawful disclosure. This was on the basis that, because the initial disclosure was with authority, the Australian Government maintained control of the disclosure and would have the opportunity to ensure that appropriate safeguards were in place, or were put in place, to protect the information.

6.160   A number of stakeholders were firmly of the view, however, that these mechanisms did not provide adequate protection.[160] They suggested that there should also be a criminal offence where Commonwealth information is disclosed to a person for a specified purpose, or in confidence, and that person discloses it for an unrelated and unauthorised purpose, knowing or reckless as to whether the disclosure will, or is likely to, cause harm.

6.161   The ALRC is concerned that basing this subsequent disclosure offence on the fact that information is disclosed for a specified purpose may create uncertainty. In the taxation context, taxation information may only be disclosed to specific parties and for specific purposes, and so it is possible to draft a subsequent disclosure offence with sufficient clarity to prohibit the disclosure of taxation information except ‘for the original purpose or in connection with the original purpose’.[161] This is not possible in the context of the general secrecy offence and subsequent disclosure offences because the provisions apply to all Commonwealth information, and the circumstances in which such information may be disclosed are not defined in the same way.

6.162   The ALRC recommends, therefore, that the second subsequent disclosure offence be based on the model provided by the UK Official Secrets Act and recommended by the Gibbs Committee. This offence would be committed where Commonwealth information is disclosed to a person who is not a Commonwealth officer, on terms requiring it to be held in confidence, and that person discloses the information in breach of those terms knowing, intending, or reckless as to whether, the disclosure will, or is reasonably likely to, harm one of the specified public interests. As noted in Chapter 3, an obligation to hold information in confidence may arise in a number of ways, for example, on the basis of the circumstances in which the information is disclosed, or because of an express contractual stipulation.

6.163   This offence will cover some conduct currently covered by s 79 of the Crimes Act, that is, the unauthorised disclosure of information ‘entrusted to a person by a Commonwealth officer or a person holding office under the Queen’ and ‘by reason of the its nature or the circumstances under which it was entrusted to him or her … it is his or her duty to treat it as a secret’. Section 79(3), for example, makes it an offence to disclose such information without a duty or the authority to disclose it. The recommended subsequent disclosure offence is, however, limited to disclosures that are likely to harm an essential public interest.

6.164   It is the ALRC’s view that it would not be appropriate to provide an exception from criminal liability under the subsequent disclosure offences for the media where the disclosure is intentional and there is the requisite fault element in relation to the potential harm. Both the initial and subsequent disclosure offences are framed to indicate the circumstances in which disclosure is clearly not in the public interest. Those circumstances are defined and limited to protect only essential public interests, where the unauthorised disclosure will, or is reasonably likely to, have very serious consequences. In the ALRC’s view, the intentional and unauthorised disclosure of such information warrants criminal sanctions.

6.165   In the ALRC’s view it would not be appropriate to criminalise the mere receipt of Commonwealth information in the subsequent disclosure offences—even where the information has been disclosed in contravention of the general secrecy offence—if there is no subsequent disclosure. Those who receive such information should have the opportunity to take appropriate action, for example, to inform the relevant agency.

6.166   The proposed subsequent disclosure offences should be subject to a number of exceptions and defences. These are discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Chapter 2 considers the Australian Government’s proposal to develop public interest disclosure legislation. It will be important to ensure that, under the proposed legislation, where a Commonwealth officer makes a public interest disclosure in accordance with public interest disclosure legislation—and is therefore protected from criminal liability under any relevant secrecy offence, including the recommended general secrecy offence—the subsequent disclosure of the information by a non-Commonwealth officer is also protected. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 7.

Recommendation 1–17           There should be a new offence in the Criminal Code (Cth) for the subsequent unauthorised disclosure of Commonwealth information where:

Recommendation 1–18           (a)                     the information has been disclosed by Commonwealth officer A to B (not a Commonwealth officer) in breach of the general secrecy offence; and

Recommendation 1–19           (b)         B knows, or is reckless as to whether, the information has been disclosed in breach of the general secrecy offence; and

Recommendation 1–20           (c )        B knows, intends or is reckless as to whether the subsequent disclosure will harm—or knows or is reckless as to whether the subsequent disclosure is reasonably likely to harm—one of the public interests set out in Recommendation 5–1.

Recommendation 1–21           There should be a new offence in the Criminal Code (Cth) for the subsequent unauthorised disclosure of Commonwealth information where:

Recommendation 1–22           the information has been disclosed by Commonwealth officer A to B (not a Commonwealth officer) on terms requiring it to be held in confidence;

Recommendation 1–23           B knows, or is reckless as to whether, the information has been disclosed on terms requiring it to be held in confidence; and

Recommendation 1–24           B knows, intends or is reckless as to whether the subsequent disclosure will harm—or knows or is reckless as to whether the subsequent disclosure is reasonably likely to harm—one of the public interests set out in Recommendation 5–1

[1]           Sections 70 and 79(3) are described in detail in Chs 3 and 4, and set out in full in Appendix 5.

[12]          Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1987 (Cth) sch 1. This issue is discussed further in Ch 2.

[13]          Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Criminal Code Amendment (Theft, Fraud, Bribery and Related Offences) Bill 2000 (Cth), [371]–[372].

[14]          Explanatory Material, Exposure Draft, Tax Laws Amendment (Confidentiality of Taxpayer Information) Bill 2009 (Cth), [2.8]. See Exposure Draft, Tax Laws Amendment (Confidentiality of Taxpayer Information) Bill 2009 (Cth) sch 1 pt 1 cl 355-25. The contractual relationship between the Australian Government and contracted service provider entities and individuals is discussed in Ch 13.

[15]          Australian Securities & Investments Commission, Submission SR 41, 17 March 2009; Public Interest Advocacy Centre Ltd, Submission SR 38, 9 March 2009; Australian Federal Police, Submission SR 33, 3 March 2009; Australian Taxation Office, Submission SR 13, 16 February 2009; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission SR 12, 13 February 2009.

[16]          Department of Human Services, Submission SR 26, 20 February 2009.

[124]         J McGinness, ‘Secrecy Provisions in Commonwealth Legislation’ (1990) 19 Federal Law Review 49, 64.

[125]         Explanatory Material, Exposure Draft, Tax Laws Amendment (Confidentiality of Taxpayer Information) Bill 2009 (Cth), [3.9].

[126]         Exposure Draft, Tax Laws Amendment (Confidentiality of Taxpayer Information) Bill 2009 (Cth) sch 1 pt 1 cl 355-155.

[127]         Ibid.

[128]         Explanatory Material, Exposure Draft, Tax Laws Amendment (Confidentiality of Taxpayer Information) Bill 2009 (Cth), [3.32].

[129]         Recommendations 6–6, 6–7.

[130]         Departmental Committee on Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, Report of the Committee, Vol 1 (1972), 85.

[131]         Ibid, 86.

[132]         Official Secrets Act 1989 (UK) s 5.

[133]       See, eg, Commonwealth v Fairfax (1980) 147 CLR 39, 50–51 in which Mason J concluded that the information had probably been leaked by a public servant in breach of his or her duty and contrary to the security classifications marked on some of the documents.

[134]       See, eg, Victoria v Nine Network (2007) 19 VR 476.

[135]         The equitable action for breach of confidence in relation to Commonwealth information is discussed in Ch 3.

[136]       Australian Parliament—House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, In Confidence: A Report of the Inquiry into the Protection of Confidential Personal and Commercial Information Held by the Commonwealth (1995), [7.11.7].

[137]         H Gibbs, R Watson and A Menzies, Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law: Final Report (1991), 333.

[138]       Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Secrecy Laws, Issues Paper 34 (2008), Question 3–5.

[139]         Australian Securities & Investments Commission, Submission SR 41, 17 March 2009; Attorney-General’s Department, Submission SR 36, 6 March 2009; Australian Federal Police, Submission SR 33, 3 March 2009; Department of Human Services, Submission SR 26, 20 February 2009; The Treasury, Submission SR 22, 19 February 2009; Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, Submission SR 18, 18 February 2009; Australian Taxation Office, Submission SR 13, 16 February 2009; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission SR 12, 13 February 2009.

[140]         Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Secrecy Laws, Discussion Paper 74 (2009), Proposal
8–3.

[141]         State and territory secrecy provisions are discussed in Chs 3 and 13.

[142]         The equitable action for breach of confidence is discussed in Ch 3.

[143]         Attorney-General’s Department, Submission SR 36, 6 March 2009.

[144]         Department of Human Services, Submission SR 83, 8 September 2009; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission SR 71, 16 August 2009; Liberty Victoria, Submission SR 50, 5 August 2009; Australian Securities & Investments Commission, Submission SR 41, 17 March 2009; Australian Federal Police, Submission SR 33, 3 March 2009; Department of Human Services, Submission SR 26, 20 February 2009; Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, Submission SR 18, 18 February 2009; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Submission SR 12, 13 February 2009.

[145]         Australian Intelligence Community, Submission SR 77, 20 August 2009.

[146]         Australian Taxation Office, Submission SR 55, 7 August 2009.

[147]         The Treasury, Submission SR 60, 10 August 2009.

[148]         Ibid.

[149]         Department of Health and Ageing, Submission SR 81, 28 August 2009; Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, Submission SR 73, 17 August 2009; Australian Federal Police, Submission SR 70, 14 August 2009.

[150]         Australian Intelligence Community, Submission SR 77, 20 August 2009.

[151]         Attorney-General’s Department, Submission SR 67, 14 August 2009.

[152]         Civil Liberties Australia, Submission SR 47, 27 July 2009.

[153]         Ibid.

[154]         Australian Press Council, Submission SR 62, 12 August 2009.

[155]         Australian Press Council, Submission SR 16, 18 February 2009.

[156]         Ibid.

[157]         Non-Custodial Parents Party (Equal Parenting), Submission SR 82, 3 September 2009; L McNamara, Submission SR 51, 6 August 2009.

[158]         L McNamara, Submission SR 51, 6 August 2009.

[159]         Explanatory Material, Exposure Draft, Tax Laws Amendment (Confidentiality of Taxpayer Information) Bill 2009 (Cth), [3.9].

[160]         Department of Health and Ageing, Submission SR 81, 28 August 2009; Australian Intelligence Community, Submission SR 77, 20 August 2009; Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, Submission SR 73, 17 August 2009; Australian Federal Police, Submission SR 70, 14 August 2009; Attorney-General’s Department, Submission SR 67, 14 August 2009.

[161]         Exposure Draft, Tax Laws Amendment (Confidentiality of Taxpayer Information) Bill 2009 (Cth) sch 1 pt 1 cl 355-175.