3. Restricted access systems

Published on 25 October 2011. Last modified on 18 November 2011.

Restricted access systems are intended to stop minors from accessing certain content on the internet by verifying a person's age. Should restricted access systems continue to have a role in a national classification scheme. Do you have any suggestions of alternatives or improvements to the current restricted access systems?

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Comments (43)

Re assessing "likely to be

Submitted by Irene G on 11 November 2011.
Re assessing "likely to be R18+" to determine whether or not RAS is necessary, DP77 says "The ALRC proposes that providers of content that is likely to be R 18+ should not need to be trained to determine the likely classification of content." (para 8.12) ............. Also scattered through DP77 are footnotes saying e.g.: "64 For example, see Classification Board, Decision on ACMA 2011003487 Item 7 (2011). Note that this content was also classified RC because of items 1(a) and 1(c) of the Code." ............. Is the ARLC aware that no content provider, or any other member of the general public, can *see* that Classification Board report providing its reasons for classifying whatever item of Internet content that is, because the entire Internet censorship regime operates in a black hole of secrecy, intentionally implemented by the Federal Government/Parliament. It seems quite apparent that the ALRC has been provided with secret information. .............. In 2003, the Fed. FOI Act was amended for the specific purpose of preventing anyone from being able to find out any information about Classification Board reasons for their decisions on Internet content, not even when the content was classified G, PG or M. ............. There's a bunch of issues about how the Board classifies web pages in relation to "context", i.e. differently from a book or an article in a printed magazine. Offline publishers and distributors are readily able to view and read offline films and publications and know the classification category that was applied by the Board. They can also read Review Board detailed reasons for classification decisions (albeit not many are made). While that's far from sufficient in relation to trying to guess how any content "would be" classified, even such minimal opportunity to self-educate is intentionally denied to online content providers. ............. Furthermore, the ALRC's remarks about what it reckons "responsible content providers" should do (in the section about RAS and likely R18+) is offensive to me. Eleven years ago I (and the non-profit organisation for which I then worked, EFA) attempted to obtain information under FOI, about online content classification decisions, that we expected would be of some, albeit probably minor, assistance to content providers who wanted to try to be "responsible". The reason the FOI Act was changed was precisely because we tried to do that.

I'd also like to say that I

Submitted by Arved von Brasch on 12 November 2011.
I'd also like to say that I find Irene's work on this to be outstanding, and the ALRC would do well to listen to what she has to say. I only wish I had as much time to respond to this part of the process. Thank you Irene.

Another problem with

Submitted by Irene G on 8 November 2011.
Another problem with mandating that content be hidden behind RAS, is that the content can't be accessed for indexing by search engines' spiders/web crawlers. Therefore Australian adults can't find, via use of a search engine such as Google, information they may be interested in that is hosted in AU behind an RAS. They will, of course, be able to find information on overseas sites. Similarly AU businesses providing adult content are impeded in attracting overseas customers because their site can't be found (unless they pay to advertise somewhere). What was that about fundamental reform again? Oh yes, I remember now, one of the proposed new guiding principles is "(6) the classification regulatory framework should not impede competition and innovation, and not disadvantage Australian media content and service providers in international markets".

Another problem with

Submitted by cw on 9 November 2011.
Another problem with mandating that content be hidden behind RAS, is that the content can't be accessed for indexing by search engines' spiders/web crawlers. Once again I find myself in furious agreement with Irene. I would like to add, before it is suggested, that it is not possible to present the "protected" content to the webcrawler for indexing but the RAS landing page to users. This practice is in breach of most search engines conditions and would be enough to get your entire domain (and related domains) removed from their index.

And if you did that, there is

Submitted by JOT on 9 November 2011.
And if you did that, there is also a fair risk that you would end up presenting the real content, unrestricted by a RAS, to users. --- For example, if your web server happened to be capable of presenting different content depending on the User-Agent header then a user could bypass the RAS simply by pretending to be a webcrawler. --- Unless having the knowledge to change the User-Agent header is considered an adequate barrier so that this would qualify as a RAS. (-:

Not exactly related to RAS

Submitted by JOT on 8 November 2011.
Not exactly related to RAS but ... in the Discussion Paper at 1.25 it says "The ALRC will release additional analysis of the public submissions responding to the Issues Paper questions, making use of qualitative analysis software, during October 2011." Has this happened? If so, can you provide a link?

Thanks for this question. We

Submitted by Terry Flew - Co... on 9 November 2011.
Thanks for this question. We are running a little behind schedule on providing the Leximancer analysis, but a large amount of the data has been processed. I have presented on the findings at two recent events: "Politics of Play" at Macquarie University on 27 October and "Knowledge/Culture/Social Change" at the University of Western Sydney on 8 November. A full analysis will be available next week.

I see that some information

Submitted by JOT on 18 November 2011.
I see that some information pertaining to 1.25 has been released. ----------- It would be interesting to see the analysis run on just the confidential submissions - since we will never get to see their actual content. Do the confidential submissions differ in vibe from the non-confidential submissions?

The lack of an analysis is a

Submitted by Amy Hightower on 10 November 2011.
The lack of an analysis is a bit of hindrance to writing a response to the dicussion paper in places; is it possible that the timeframe for responses can be extended to reflect the delay in the publication of relevant statistical information?

I look forward to being able

Submitted by Irene G on 9 November 2011.
I look forward to being able to read a full analysis, especially given that, although DP77 says "1.25 The ALRC received 2,452 submissions, the vast majority of which were not confidential, and are available for viewing from the ALRC website", as at 4 Nov 2011 (when I last checked number), there were only 1463 submissions in response to IP40 on the web site. That is not my definition of "a vast majority".

Irene The number of

Submitted by Terry Flew on 10 November 2011.
Irene The number of confidential submissions received by the ALRC in response to IP40 was 819. Of these, ony two were confidential for commercial or other related reasons - they were from individuals who did not want their names up on the ALRC site for some or other reason. In addition 12 public submissions were not published onine, either becasue the individuals divulged personal data in teh submission, or they were in a format that could not be put up onto the Web (e.g. handwritten letters). I hope that this clarifies the issue. I accept that the majority in this regard may not be "vast" as referred to in the Discussion Paper.

@Terry Flew ... I don't know

Submitted by JOT on 11 November 2011.
@Terry Flew ... I don't know whether I understood what you wrote but, assuming I did, it may help in the future to give users three publication options viz. ----- 1) 'confidential' - not publicly available at all ----- 2) 'anonymous' - content is published but name is not published ----- 3) 'public' - content and name are published ----- I say this because that is a surprisingly large number of confidential submissions. While I respect people's right to have private communication, I think that such a large number does somewhat undermine a transparent consultation process. (This is not the ALRC's fault.)

Terry, you've apparently

Submitted by Irene G on 11 November 2011.
Terry, you've apparently partly understood what I was meaning to say... What I meant re numbers is this: DP77 says 2452 submissions received, subtract 819 confidential and subtract 12 not published for other reasons = 1621 that seemingly 'should be' on web site. However number on web site at approx 10am this morning was 1497. 1621-1497 = 124. Why haven't those 124 submissions been put on the web site? ................ Re transparency, your suggested 3 options for submitters would be a major improvement. It's more like what an unknown number of Fed. gov't agencies have started doing during the last decade or so, both to improve transparency and because some of them (probably many by now) became aware of the time consuming problem that arises when a member of the public lodges an FOI application for copies of submissions if they haven't asked submitters in advance to specify what they're claiming confidentiality about. Basically they have to write to every confidential submitter advising that an FOI application has been received and asking the persons to present a claim/reasons for exemption from release. At least that's what I was told some years ago as the applicant on behalf of an organisation for copies of submissions to an OFLC Consultation Paper on review of Classification Guidelines (at a time when no submissions at all were published online). ............ Some gov't depts, agencies, etc go further than your suggestion. For example, the ACMA writes in its consultation papers something much like this: that ACMA prefers to receive non-confidential submissions and if a submitter wishes to request confidentiality they must clearly specify the paragraphs in the submission that they want to be confidential. ............. Senate Committees go further - they say on the web page about submissions: "The committee will sympathetically consider requests for confidentiality, but cannot make promises in advance. If you have concerns about confidentiality, please discuss with the committee secretary before you make the submission."

Thanks, Terry, for numbers

Submitted by Irene G on 11 November 2011.
Thanks, Terry, for numbers info. That helps, but unless I'm misunderstanding what you said, it seems that as at today, there are still 124 submissions (after 34 more were added to the site yesterday) that have not been published for some other reason (perhaps inadvertent, lack of time). This may not be of much concern to me (depending on what sort of info the analysis will contain) if they are all from individuals who are not current or former politicians, government bureaucrats or members of statutory bodies etc. However, at present, I have no reason to believe that would be the case. Of the 4 missing submissions I originally asked about (since published), 2 were from organisations and 1 was from a former Director of the Classification Board/OFLC. Of the 34 added yesterday, one was from an organisation (AFACT).

That is a good question. In

Submitted by JOT on 10 November 2011.
That is a good question. In the absence of response from the ALRC I wonder whether the "2,452 submissions" was simply a mistake. --- Someone looked at the highest numbered submission, and added 1 for some unknown reason. That would leave us wondering why there are so many gaps in the numbering though.

Re JOT's remark about gaps in

Submitted by Irene G on 10 November 2011.
Re JOT's remark about gaps in numbering, as at 27 Oct there were only 1459 submissions on the site. 4 more were added the next day after I emailed ALRC questioning whether 4 submissions quoted in DP77 (with name of submitter and without saying the submission was confidential) were confidential given they were not on the site. I was informed that non-publication appeared to been inadvertent omissions associated with a busy time managing a large number of submissions and that the ALRC is a small agency with limited administrative resources. ........................ As I remarked to the ALRC person when thanking them for having so promptly investigated and published the 4 submissions, I knew the ALRC is a small agency and in my opinion the time frame allocated by the gov't is short for such a massive review. While I didn't say it then, imo the time frame should be much longer, or the government should have provided the ALRC with significant increased funding for the purpose of enabling the ALRC to become adequately well informed as to issues and consequences of proposals, and conduct a review in such a way that there would be significantly more chance of coherent, practical, workable, and fair and just proposals and recommendations emanating from the review. Quite frankly, I am very doubtful that a final report, if provided to the Fed. A-G by 31 January, will have much if any credibility among people who are knowledgeable about technology and/or current classification policy, procedures, and law.

I'm a bit confused about the

Submitted by Lin. on 6 November 2011.
I'm a bit confused about the Commission's approach here. In parts of the discussion paper dealing with the X and RC classifications the Commission seems to treat the legal status of material in these categories as a matter for the government. But other parts of the discussion paper, including the parts dealing with RASs, make recommendations that would result in some material that is now in practice unaffected by censorship being prohibited (mostly as a result of giving the proposed regulator clear jurisdiction over online content, and presumably expecting it to exercise this jurisdiction). Does the Commission really see its role in this review as proposing new ways of restricting access to content, but not examining the question of whether material that is now prohibited because of its classification should continue to be prohibited? If so, this seems to be an odd reading of the terms of reference - it's hard to think of a matter more directly relevant to a consideration of classification rules than the legal results of the application of those rules. If nothing else it falls pretty clearly into "any other related matter".

Thank you for your comment,

Submitted by ALRC legal team on 7 November 2011.
Thank you for your comment, Lin. The Issues Paper received a wide – and highly divergent – range of views on what content, if any, should be restricted to adults or even banned. The ALRC has commissioned a pilot study to consider the current higher level classification categories. We anticipate that this and other work in future should inform any government decision about the scope of the categories. However, the ALRC sees its inquiry as being primarily concerned with reviewing the ‘architecture’ of the classification system.

Thank you for your reply. I

Submitted by Lin. on 8 November 2011.
Thank you for your reply. I have to say that I am honestly struggling to find any suggestion in the terms of reference that the review was not intended to consider the scope of all of the classification categories, or that it was intended to consider the appropriateness of existing and proposed measures for prohibiting and restricting access to material classified R and below but not to do the same for material classified above R. The terms of reference expressly provide for the Commission to "consider ...the classification categories contained in the Classification Act, National Classification Code and Classification Guidelines" (not take them as given, which looking back I now see was indicated in paragraph 11 of the issues paper!) as well as "relevant existing Commonwealth, State and Territory laws and practices". Could you please explain a bit more what you mean by the "architecture" of the classification system, and what aspects of the national classification system and related laws and practices this doesn't cover? Surely the Commission doesn't regard the fact that the terms of reference did not expressly include the word "censorship" as excluding from the scope of the review any measure in those Commonwealth, State and Territory laws and practices that results from classification decisions but could be described as a form of censorship. Because if it does, this review is going to be a massive lost opportunity for sensible reform.

(Sorry, I just realised that

Submitted by Lin. on 9 November 2011.
(Sorry, I just realised that the word "censorship" actually does occur several times in the terms of reference, including in the title. I apologise for the misinformation).

Lin writes: "...The terms of

Submitted by Irene Graham on 9 November 2011.
Lin writes: "...The terms of reference expressly provide for the Commission to 'consider ...the classification categories...'". Indeed. And the Communiqué of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General reporting on decisions made at their meeting of 10 December 2010 states; "Ministers agreed on the need to reform the National Classification Scheme to accommodate and better anticipate technological and other developments. Ministers agreed to the Commonwealth referring the matter to the Australian Law Reform Commission. Ministers agreed that the broad review of the National Classification Scheme would include consideration of the classification categories, including the content of the RC (Refused Classification) classification, for films, computer games and publications." If the ALRC genuinely believes it's only supposed to reviewing so-called "architecture" (as distinct, for example, from just being gutless), then I suggest the ALRC seek clarification from the Fed A-G concerning what the terms of references do or were intended to mean.

RE Irene on the SCAG meeting:

Submitted by Amy Hightower on 10 November 2011.
RE Irene on the SCAG meeting: And, of course, if we go back just a little further, we're reminded that this entire review was prompted in the first instance by growing understanding and concern about the overly broad scope of the Refused Classification category, and its the potential use of this category as the basis of Labor's proposed (and deeply... flawed) internet filter. "In order to address these concerns, the Government will recommend a review of the RC classification to State and Territory Ministers, be conducted at the earliest opportunity. The review would examine the current scope of the existing RC classification, and whether it adequately reflects community standards." (Outcome of consultations on Transparency and Accountability for ISP Filtering of RC content http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2010/068).

I agree with Lin and Irene:

Submitted by Amy Hightower on 8 November 2011.
I agree with Lin and Irene: there seems to be a fundamental disconnect here between the ALRC's willingness to, in effect, propose new restrictions while refusing to examine the merit of existing ones. A true review of the 'architecture' of the system cannot take place without an examination of the foundations and assumptions on which it is built. Currently, the ALRC appears to be proposing to build its shining new framework over the creaking assumptions and contested definitions of the old system. That hardly seems conducive to producing the fundamental reform demanded by all sides of the censorship debate; indeed, it seems more likely to simply change the processes through which the current unsatisfactory outcomes are achieved.

Following on from Lin's

Submitted by Irene G on 7 November 2011.
Following on from Lin's remarks (with which I agree), what grounds and justification does the ALRC believe it has to propose/recommend *extending* a Cth Regulator powers and responsibilities to prosecuting and/or applying any type of penalty to content providers, including "ordinary" individuals, who speak, or in any other form, make actual or "likely to be" R18+ "content" available online without a restricted access system? DP77 proposes that without one iota of evidence, nor even suggestion, that the existing enforcement powers of the ACMA (which are not applicable to content providers) in relation to unrestricted R18+, or any other type of "prohibited content", are not sufficient and adequate. The ALRC's proposal to make online content providers liable to penalties under Cth law (a) was not canvassed in prior ALRC paper IP40, and has not been the subject of public consultation and debate since a decade ago; (b) raises a raft of criminal and other justice issues that are not mentioned in DP77, let alone addressed - including but not limited to - in effect making ordinary Australians liable to prosecution and penalty for inabililty to foresee a non-unanimous decision of the Classification Board, and/or a decision of a single member of the Classification Board; (d) offers no means of enabling individuals to protect themselves from (c) due to the exorbitant cost of classification by the Classification Board; and (e) is directly contrary to the evident decisions since 1999 to date of all State/Territory Parliaments and Governments (except S.A.) that it is undesirable to make their citizens liable to penalty for providing unrestricted R18+ content. For a comprehensive discussion of the issues, see: Report of the NSW Parliament Standing Committee on Social Issues, "Safety Net? Inquiry into the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Enforcement Amendment Bill 2001, Final Report: On-line Matters", June 2002. The findings and recommendations in that report are the reasons why NSW does *not* have online content regulation legislation, applicable to content providers, in operation.

Thank you for your comment,

Submitted by ALRC legal team on 7 November 2011.
Thank you for your comment, Irene. You raise a number of important issues, particularly about what obligations, if any, ‘ordinary individuals’ should have to restrict access to the content they provide. Should ‘ordinary individuals’ be expected to at least warn people that their website (for example) has content that is only appropriate for adults, even if they can’t actually restrict access?

What does "be expected to at

Submitted by Irene G on 8 November 2011.
What does "be expected to at least warn people..." mean? Either providing warnings has to be entirely voluntary, or else the only means of enforcing a requirement to warn people is to apply penalties to those who do not, which entails the same criminal justice type issues previously mentioned, i.e. penalty for inability to foresee a CB classification decision that puts the content in a category that must be warned about. (Also, if cw hadn't already remarked about unworkability of putting warnings on web sites, I would have said something similar).

One fundamental obstacle here

Submitted by JOT on 8 November 2011.
One fundamental obstacle here is ... trust. --- I could readily label every page of my web site with some kind of classification, which PC-based filtering software could then use to ensure that delicate internet users do not experience discomfort. But then the government could equally readily require ISPs to block based on those same labels (at some performance cost). Unless the government decides to separate classification from prohibition !! --- Such labelling at least addresses the "front door" problem that cw alludes to. --- Labelling does however suffer from multiple "standards" e.g. every government defines its own standards and there are various non-government standards. So it would be better if, in the online world, governments abandoned their own inconsistent unique standards and settled on a single common standard. But that is so far away from the direction that the ALRC appears to be going in ...

Voluntary labelling in a

Submitted by Irene G on 8 November 2011.
Voluntary labelling in a manner that enables blocking by PC-based software is another back-to-the-future debate, one that was had in AU and around the world in the 1990s, particularly after then Chair (Peter Webb) of Australian Broadcasting Authority (since merged to form the ACMA) said in 1996: "An obligation to utilise PICS-type systems ... might have to be enforced". PICS - Platform for Internet Control - is an infrastructure which the developers claimed was intended to facilitate "voluntary" labelling and selection of Internet content. However, it soon became apparent to many Net users world-wide that it was actually ideal for censorious governments (it is actually designed to facilitate blocking by ISPs, employers, etc, etc), which I strongly believe is a major reason why use of PICS has been more or less dead in the water since years ago. It's pretty useless unless a vast, vast amount of content on the world wide web is labelled, and there is surety that all labelled content is labelled *correctly* (and such surety is impossible). There's absolutely nothing to stop criminals, malicious and mischievious people around the world putting the wrong rating labels on their content, i.e. labelling content suitable for children when it's not. The most well-known PICS-facilitated labelling system was RSACi/ICRA (an imo brain dead rating scheme, what a surprise). The organisation that previously provided the automated ICRA content labelling engine discontinued it (took it offline) in about Oct 2010. Suppose they finally decided that trying to enourage Net users to voluntarily rate and label their content, so that it could be blocked, was a hopeless exercise.

Common courtesy suggests that

Submitted by Amy Hightower on 8 November 2011.
Common courtesy suggests that they do. Hell, common courtesy, for the most part, sees that they already do, where possible and logical. But the only actual obligation 'ordinary users' should have is to not post illegal content. To require otherwise would quickly descend into farce ("warning: the next tweet will be rated R18+") and just as quickly result in every one of the millions of internet-using Australians ignoring said requirement. Of course, not requiring 'ordinary' users to use a RAS to lock away adult content makes requiring 'commercial' users to do the same utterly pointless...

Should ‘ordinary individuals’

Submitted by cw on 7 November 2011.
Should ‘ordinary individuals’ be expected to at least warn people that their website (for example) has content that is only appropriate for adults, even if they can’t actually restrict access? And how would that work? A website isn't like an building, with a nice front door for the public to come through. Every page is likely to be directly accesible, and it overlooks dynamic content generation. I really would like to get a straight answer on why something made available on a webpage is so more dangerous that it warrants special attention when compared to conversation that might be had in a pub. Or on the lawns of parliament house for that matter.

Another general issue with

Submitted by JOT on 31 October 2011.
Another general issue with RAS is that ... content that "should be" restricted on the internet falls into two categories. 1. It is free. OR 2. It costs money. --- In the second case, while the site operator almost certainly does not operate an Australian-approved RAS, the site operator nevertheless does provide some kind of barrier e.g. sign-up and pay somehow. It is in their interests to do so - if they want to make a profit. So an Australian-approved RAS would add little value over and above what is in place. --- It is the first case that it is the problem. It is unreasonable to expect the infrastructure to be in place that would restrict access to free content.

Restricted access systems

Submitted by Amy Hightower on 30 October 2011.
Restricted access systems essentially come in two flavours: ineffective or invasive. On the ineffective end of the scale, we have credit-card based authentication schemes, based on the surprisingly persistent myth that only adults have access to credit cards. On the invasive end of the scale resides the the idea of verifying online identities the same way we verify them online: the old 100 points of ID. Both systems have a high cost of compliance for operators. Both systems pose security risks for their users: the risk of monetary theft, of information theft, of identity theft. And, despite the way I've categorised them, both systems pose a privacy threat for users. Moreover, when the burden of complying with regulation within Australia becomes too high – and, for many operators, the cost of implementing an RAS under the current ineffective guidelines already is – operators will move overseas. They will still be able to serve their Australian customerbase (and, indeed, may well be able to offer them a better experience than their locally hosted counterparts) but will have removed themselves almost entirely from the reach of the Australian legal system.

If RAS requirements are to

Submitted by Irene G on 30 October 2011.
If RAS requirements are to apply, as the ALRC proposes in DP77, to content that ALRC proposes is not required to be classified but "is likely to be R18+", such requirements should *not* apply to content produced/provided on a non-commercial basis by non-commercial content providers. In that regard, I am highly disturbed to find that the ALRC proposes a significant change from the existing BSA in relation to enforcing RAS requirements. Quote: "8.13 The ALRC considers that if the Regulator, perhaps after receiving a complaint, considers that a piece of content is likely to be R 18+, the Regulator should issue a notice to the content provider requiring it to restrict access to the content or have the content classified. This notice might be called a ‘restrict or classify notice’." That is a major problem because the vast majority of non-commercial content providers cannot afford to pay to have their content classified. Under the existing BSA, ACMA cannot issue a final takedown notice until after ACMA has had it classified by the Classification Board, and ACMA pays the classification fee. In addition, non-commercial providers have no means at all of restricting access such that only adults have access - even if a credit/debit card was an effective means, non-commercial providers have no means of even ascertaining whether a card number is a valid, current card. Such providers who receive a notice from the Regulator claiming the content "would be R18+" would have no choice but to delete the content. Such a situation is unjust and worse than the existing BSA (without any improvement in protection of minors) especially given it is provable that the existing Regulator, ACMA, has been wrong when they've guessed/assumed how content "would be" classified (which is quite probably one of the reasons for the increase in ACMA applications to the Board in the last couple of years).

I Agree with Irene G. If

Submitted by Fred on 31 October 2011.
I Agree with Irene G. If authorities disagree then they should be the ones required to classify the content. Be it R18+, X18+, RC. If they are not required then it can be used by authorities, special interest groups convincing the authorities to apply their standards and not the CB standards. Just look at ACMA stats and one can see that they make a number of mistakes (when CB classifies lower than what ACMA guessed). And why do we even have RC, if its illegal then remove the content if not illegal then give it a proper classification.

I agree with Irene, this is

Submitted by cw on 30 October 2011.
I agree with Irene, this is indeed significant concern. It is also foreseeable that it will be abused. The proposal for a "restrict or classify" notice could be used by those that do not agree with the publication of certain content. The financial costs classifcation or compliance costs for restricting access for small operators will likely result in the content being removed. The classification system should not be able to be manipulated by individuals to suppress the publication of content that is legal but they do not agree with.

Worth noting is that the

Submitted by Amy Hightower on 30 October 2011.
Worth noting is that the ALRC's proposal here is also somewhat at odds with item 1.40: "The ALRC also proposes that media content should be classified before: enforcement agencies require someone to stop distributing content (whether on the internet or otherwise); enforcement agencies prosecute someone for distributing content; and before the content is added to any proposed list of content that must be filtered by internet service providers." As Irene points out, for most operators, particularly non-commerical operators, the 'restrict or classify' notice is almost certain to be treated as a 'restrict, classify or remove' notice; the cost of compliance to the 'restrict' or 'classify' part of the order is onerous. This proposal is therefore effectively allowing the regulator to take action to stop the distribution of media content before it has been classified. In addition, there will be operators who can afford compliance with the 'restrict' option of the order without having the material classified. In this way, the ALRC is ensuring the creation of yet another classification grey area: material that is not R18+ but is treated as though it is. This mirrors several of the problems inherrent to the RC category (problems this review seems strangely uninterested in addressing, but those are concerns for another time) and prohibited content.

The problem with this

Submitted by Oliver Yeudall on 26 October 2011.
The problem with this question is that there are a LOT of different variables that need to be taken into consideration. Is the content commercial or generated for free consumption? Is it made by the content provider itself or is the content user generated? Is the content hosted in Australia or overseas, where they arent bound by our classification laws? Each one really needs its own topic as they will require a lot of discussion. Staying on the topic of age verification, there are a few methods available, but not many of them work. A few seem to satisfy overseas legislators, so they could also work for Australian content. One commonly used method for commercial content is to use credit cards to verify age at the point of sale. Younger people can use their parents' cards, but it really is their parents' responsibility to control access to such cards. We also need to make sure that age gates are not bypassed by those pre-paid cards (iTunes, bigpond movies ect) you can buy in physical retail. There is another verification method used by a few online dating sites, which is secure but too cumbersome for large scale use. Essentially it's a full identity check that requires multiple forms of ID and, in some cases, police clearance. It's good for dating sites as it ensures safety for its users, satisfying duty of care requirements. To summerise there are many methods out there for age verification, but it is a bit premature discussing them without talking about the other factors first.

Restricted access system

Submitted by cw on 25 October 2011.
Restricted access system should have no continued role is a national classification system. Apart from the fact classification should not continue to be conflated with censorship. Current RAS are useless, it seems impossible to verify anyones age in any remotely reliable way. Relying on credit cards is stupid, yet that seems to be the current method. To implement something that begins to deliver the required age verification service it would require a significant impost of the users privacy. The credit card RAS system seem to be based on the assumption that anything remotely "interesting" will be charged for. That is simply not the case. An example of how the RAS system currently fails is the Bigpond Movies system. I know the ACMA have been asked whether it meets the requirements, presumably it does because BPM is still operating. BPM ask for a credit card for age verification but do not necessarily charge any fee to it if you pay via a prepaid voucher. I was able to sign up for an account with BPM using my wife's credit card which was not charged. I then bought a prepaid voucher from Big W paying cash and entered the code online. I was then able to hire MA15+ and R18+ movies without any charge to my wife's credit card. I don't think there is anything that could be done to improve the system, it is time to recognise it doesn't work and get rid of it. It only acts as an impediment for startups. Unnecessary compliance costs and completely ineffective.

Another failing of using a

Submitted by JOT on 28 October 2011.
Another failing of using a credit card for age verification is that it increases the risk of fraud. --- Suppose all providers of "restricted" content, whether commercial or not, and if commercial whether accepting payment by credit card or not, were forced to solicit a user's credit card for age verification purposes. That means that there are now more copies of the details of millions of credit cards. In addition, it would train people to hand over their credit card details for unrelated purposes. That sounds like a nice line in scams to me. --- Whatever dubious moral benefit is achieved by making it harder to access "restricted" content, you have to weigh that against the cost of increased fraud.

I agree with above. Also,

Submitted by Irene G on 27 October 2011.
I agree with above. Also, seems that Visa/Mastercard Debit Cards can be used to access Bigpond Movies, given a page on Telstra's web site states that to access Bigpond Movies a "credit/debit card is required". Also, various people have remarked in online fora that they use debit card to access Bigpond Movies. Pre-paid Visa Debit Cards are reportedly purchasable by unaccompanied 10 year olds from Australia Post shops (and probably other retailers), according to an "experiment" reportedly conducted by a participant in a Whirlpool forum thread about mandatory ISP filtering. After the child purchased a Debit Card, the child's father and father's friend used it to sign up to and access porn sites. Unless the info on Telstra's web site is not factual, it appears a 10 year old could access BigPond Movies using a pre-paid debit card. Also, various Australian banks etc issue Visa or Mastercard Debit Cards to applicants under 18 years, including as young as 12 years, although more typically it appears eligibility is "over 16 years of age". While in some instances, there is a requirement that the debit card be linked to a transaction account held by an adult, in other instances it appears there is no such requirement. They also issue credit cards to persons aged 16 and 17 years where the credit card is an additional card on a credit card account opened by an adult (depending on the institution, the adult may be a parent, sibling, or friend). While credit cards are apparently less available to minors than debit cards, it would be highly inappropriate to mandate only credit cards. That would discriminate against adults unable to obtain credit, and interfere with adults' freedom to choose to avoid credit card fees and over-spending by use of credit. (Ref URLs will be in subm re DP77, but can be provided sooner to ALRC staff if requested by email).

RASs should be abandoned.

Submitted by JOT on 25 October 2011.
RASs should be abandoned. There are none in existence that actually meet everyone's requirements. Even if a RAS did exist, overseas providers won't bother to use an Australian-approved RAS. "Do you have any suggestions of alternatives or improvements to the current restricted access systems?" Yes, but I don't intend to offer them because I am not satisfied that government respects adults rights sufficiently. Please amend the constitution to guarantee a general right to freedom of expression. Then we can have a level of confidence that restrictions on children tomorrow will not also be used to restrict adults the day after.

Existing "restricted access

Submitted by JDNSWDNSW on 25 October 2011.
Existing "restricted access systems" are totally ineffective in preventing access, especially by teenagers. The only slightly effective ones are those that require a credit card - but these are readily available from any supermarket checkout in prepaid form (or simply borrowed from Mum's purse), and have serious privacy concerns despite being ultimately useless. It is clear to me that it is almost certainly impossible to devise any age verification scheme that actually works without it having critical privacy problems - it would have to involve the storage by the content provider or a third party of information such as retinal patterns for every adult in the country. But even then, any such requirement will be simply ignored by overseas content providers. (most of them). PC based filtering systems plus parental supervision are likely to be much more effective.

I have yet to see a

Submitted by Fred on 25 October 2011.
I have yet to see a restriction access system that cannot be broken by Teens. Once one finds the way through it is shared with every other teen that wishes to know. And what is worse is that more teens will know how to get through the restriction than adults, will know it faster, understand it better than most adults. It is not a case of weather the idea of restricting children is a good one, but rather a case of "is it effective", "will it even work". I find that the worse part of introducing such a system is that many parents will be lulled into a false sense of protection. Some/many will even stop supervising their children's on-line activity, and this would be the worst of situations. Rather educate parents, provide resources on how to effectively install filters on the PCs the children use, how to use OpenDNS. These will provide a thousand times better protection than any ISP restriction access system