

The Protection of Human Genetic Information

Implications for Insurers

**IFSA Lunch
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Terms of reference

In relation to human genetic information and samples, how can we best:

- ◆ protect privacy
- ◆ protect against *unfair* discrimination
- ◆ ensure highest ethical standards

Application to many different contexts

- ◆ Medical research
- ◆ Clinical practice
- ◆ Systemic health care issues
- ◆ Genetic databases, tissue banks, registers
- ◆ Employment
- ◆ Insurance

- ◆ Law enforcement
- ◆ Kinship & Identity (immigration; parentage; Aboriginality?)
- ◆ Other contexts (eg sport)

Inquiry Processes

- ◆ ALRC-AHEC received ToR (Feb 2001)
- ◆ Advisory committee (geneticists, doctors, bio-ethicists, insurers, actuaries, lawyers)
- ◆ Research – national, international
- ◆ Public consultation docs (IP 26, DP 66)
- ◆ 15 public forums around Australia
- ◆ >200 meetings, consultations
- ◆ Written submissions (>300)

Final Report – March 2003

- ◆ Essentially Yours: The Protection of Human Genetic Information in Australia (ALRC 96) (launched 29 May)
- ◆ 144 recommendations
- ◆ Directed at 31 bodies: federal and state governments – health, OH&S, police, privacy, immigration; NHMRC; NATA; TGA and other regulators; IFSA and ICA; employers; educational authorities, etc

Implementation rates

- ◆ Substantial Implementation [n37-56%]
- ◆ Partial Implementation [n15-23%]
- ◆ Nil Implementation [n10-15%]
- ◆ Proposals under consideration [n4-6%]

A Human Genetics Commission

- ◆ **Centerpiece:** Recommended establishment of an independent, statutory advisory body: a **Human Genetics Commission of Australia** (HGCA)
- ◆ Recognises rapid change, need for continuing high level advice to government/industry and to maintain public confidence
- ◆ Broad-based membership (technical/expert, but also ELSI/community)
- ◆ Specific responsibilities:
 - ◆ advice to insurers, employers, regulators (eg TGA); promote genetics education; provide national leadership and coordination

Is genetic information special?

- ◆ Unique (although 99.9% ≡ !)**Ubiquitous**
- ◆ Powerful – one cell tells all
- ◆ Stable – dinosaurs to disasters
- ◆ Familial dimension
- ◆ Predictive – but interactive, contingent and complex!
- ◆ Dynamic technology

On the other hand ...

- ◆ Family history of hereditary diseases has been used for >100 years by researchers, doctors, and insurers
- ◆ Other medical tests/info also very sensitive (eg Hep B/C, HIV-AIDS, STDs, cancers, depression, psychiatric illness, brain injury)
- ◆ Artificial and unfair to separate 'genetic' and 'non-genetic' information for policy-making purposes

Employment

- ◆ Very few industrial disputes yet (police?) – but employer incentives for genetic screening
- ◆ direct economic incentives (reduce insurance premiums, sick leave, staff turnover)
- ◆ OH&S duties;
- ◆ public health and safety (eg pilots, drivers)
- ◆ So we can anticipate increased pressure for testing as costs decrease, availability increases
- ◆ Cf drug and alcohol testing, psychometric testing, workplace surveillance
- ◆ Clear public policy: everyone has right to work; part of human dignity; even work for the dole
- ◆ Fear of the creation of a 'genetic underclass' – currently fit and able, but with a *predisposition* to a genetic disease/disorder
- ◆ This justifies an interventionist approach:
 - **General rule: no use of predictive genetic testing/information**
 - ...
 - **Except** in limited cases where necessary to discharge OH&S or public safety obligations
 - **And** the test/interpretation has been approved for this purpose by the HGCA and NOHSC

Insurance fundamentals are sound

- ◆ Mutual insurance is a voluntary private market,
- ◆ It's not publicly subsidised (cf community-rated health insurance) and it's not social security
- ◆ Risk-rated life insurance is not an *essential* good (c30% take-up in Australia)
- ◆ Risk-rating based upon full disclosure – drawing distinctions among individuals – is central
- ◆ Need to preserve equity among pooled insureds
- ◆ Real risk of adverse selection – perhaps not on GT alone, in short term, but
- ...
- ◆ No arbitrary distinctions according to source of actual or predicted ill-health
- ◆ Need robust policies for the long-term, **therefore**, "no justification at present for departing from fundamental principles of full disclosure and equality of

information”; **but**, still a need for a range of improvements in interests of consumers

1. Oversight by HGCA

- ◆ Anti-discrimination law exemptions (sex, disability, age; but not race) must be based upon reasonable actuarial or statistical data
- ◆ Insurers currently self-assess the actuarial relevance of genetic information
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- ◆ HGCA to advise on the use of specific genetic tests for underwriting, and IFSA, ICA to ensure all members conform (R27-2).
- ◆ HGCA to keep a watching brief on relevant international initiatives (eg 2-tier approaches)

Other approaches?

- ◆ GTI banned in underwriting
 - eg Denmark (test results; but FMH is OK)
- ◆ Two-tier systems
 - eg UK, Holland, Sweden
 - below \$ threshold, GT results banned; only above threshold can GT results be used;
 - BUT raises many questions:
 - setting \$ threshold – link to mortgages?; index?;
 - why privilege **genetic** information?

2. Use of family medical history

- ◆ IFSA policy applies to ‘genetic test information’ but not to family medical history (FMH) – which is much more widely used.
- ◆ Long industry use of FMH, but application and interpretation less certain than GT info?
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- ◆ Insurance industry should develop and publish policies on the use of FMH in underwriting (R27-4).

3. Assuring genetic privacy

- ◆ Consent forms (including medical authority forms) should provide sufficient information for applicants to make an informed decision about consent to the collection and use of GI (R28-1)
- ◆ Applicants should not be asked for ‘bundled consents’ (R28-2)
- ◆ Insurers should seek a PID to collect information about genetic relatives (FMHs) (R28-3)

4. Reasons for adverse U/W decisions

- ◆ Currently required under s75 ICA, s107 DDA, and IFSA policy – BUT problems of scope and adequacy.

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- ◆ Insurers must inform applicants of statutory right to reasons for adverse decisions (R27-6)
- ◆ IFSA to develop mandatory policies on providing clear and meaningful reasons for adverse U/W decisions based on GT information or FMH – explaining the actuarial, statistical /or scientific basis (R27-7)

5. External review

- ◆ Review now available through insurer or HREOC – but problems of accessibility, impartiality and formality.
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- ◆ FICS' jurisdiction should be expanded to review adverse U/W decisions based on GT or FMH (R27-9):
 - in a timely and efficient manner;
 - conducted by suitably qualified individuals;
 - binding on the insurer but not the complainant; and
 - \$ cap set to cover the substantial majority of cases.

6. Industry education

- ◆ Industry should review education and training of brokers and agents regarding the collection and use of genetic information in insurance (R27-10).
- ◆ NFITAB, in association with the industry, to review competency standards and the Financial Services Training Package, to incorporate appropriate competency standards regarding the collection and use of genetic information (R27-11)

For further information

- ◆ ALRC 96 is available free online at: www.alrc.gov.au
- ◆ To purchase in hard copy or CD format,
or for further information –
- ◆ Email: genetic@alrc.gov.au
- ◆ Tel: 8238 6333
- ◆ FAX: 8238 6363